1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.

The reasoning of the judgment of the first instance is reasonable, and it is cited by the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

In accordance with the language and text of the instant mortgage contract, the Plaintiff asserts that even though the scope of the secured obligation is limited to the obligation pursuant to C’s “loan for Enterprise Driving General Funds” (credit amount: KRW 200 million) against C, the Defendant erred by failing to file an application for voluntary auction against the instant apartment owned by the Plaintiff, including the obligation pursuant to C’s “Loan for Retail Financing General Funds” (credit Amount: KRW 200 million) against the Defendant.

However, according to the statement in Eul evidence No. 5, the plaintiff prepared a civil petition on July 10, 2013, stating that "the plaintiff provided the apartment of this case as security and agreed upon C to obtain a loan of KRW 400 million from the defendant (the maximum debt amount in the copy of the register shall be KRW 480 million) for the loan of the joint representative director Eul at the request of B, who is the spouse, the plaintiff," and therefore, it is reasonable to deem that the plaintiff and the defendant agreed to set up the mortgage of this case as security for the whole debt of this case. Thus, this part of the plaintiff's assertion is without merit.

In addition, the plaintiff did not obtain the plaintiff's consent and did not make a third extension of each of the loans of this case, and the plaintiff did not make a subsequent notification, which constitutes a tort against the plaintiff. However, as stated in the judgment of the court of first instance, whether the plaintiff consented to the extension of the credit period of the secured debt does not affect the validity of the mortgage of this case (see Supreme Court Decision 98Da19578 delivered on September 7, 199), and even after examining the evidence submitted by the plaintiff in this court, C should replace it with other collateral than the apartment of this case at the time of the third extension.