1. Revocation of the first instance judgment.

2. The instant lawsuit shall be dismissed.

3. The costs of the lawsuit are assessed against the Plaintiff (Appointed Party).

1. The reasoning of the judgment of this court and this part of the Plaintiff’s assertion by the Plaintiff (Appointed Party) is as follows: (a) the reasoning of the judgment of the first instance is as follows: (b) the Plaintiff’s “Plaintiff” among the “basic facts” and the summary of the Plaintiff’s assertion” in paragraphs (1) and (2) of the reasoning of the judgment of the first instance; and (c) the Plaintiff’s “Plaintiff A” as “Plaintiff (Appointed Party)”; and (d) the Plaintiff’s “Plaintiff” as the “Appointed Party”; and (c) the Plaintiff’s status as the designated Party B, C, D, and E” are the same as the corresponding part,

2. Determination as to the defendants' main defense

A. The Defendants asserted that Defendant F’s term of office expired, and thus, Defendant F’s claim for dismissal of the administrator does not have any interest in the lawsuit.

B. In light of the above, Article 24(5) of the Multi-Family Building Act provides that "Any sectional owner may file a claim with the court for the removal of the manager if the manager has committed an unlawful act or any other reason not suitable for performing his/her duties."

The action to dismiss the receiver under the above provision is aimed at depriving the status of the receiver as the receiver. Thus, if the receiver no longer has the status as the receiver due to the resignation or expiration of the term of office, there is no legal interest in claiming the removal of such receiver.

(See Supreme Court Decision 2016Da231198 Decided September 28, 2018 (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2016Da23198). However, there is no dispute between the parties that Article 24(2) of the Aggregate Buildings Act provides that the term of office of a custodian shall be determined by the bylaws within the limit of two years, the management rules for the aggregate building of this case do not have been enacted, and that Defendant F is appointed as a manager of the Defendant Management Body on February 24, 2017 and its term of office expired on February 23, 2019.

Thus, Defendant F is no longer in the position of the manager of Defendant F management body, so the Plaintiff (Appointed Party) is in the position of the manager of Defendant F management body.