The judgment of the court below is reversed.

A defendant shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than two years and six months.

Sexual assault against the defendant for 80 hours.

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. With respect to the crime of violation of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Punishment, etc. of Sexual Crimes (compactation by deceptive means, etc. against the disabled), the Defendant did not have sexual intercourse only with the victim by force, but did not have sexual intercourse with the victim due to an act of abuse of force.

Nevertheless, the court below found the defendant guilty of this part of the facts charged. The court below erred in misunderstanding of facts.

B. The lower court’s sentencing is too unreasonable.

2. Determination

A. We examine ex officio prior to the judgment on the grounds for appeal by the defendant for ex officio judgment.

Article 56(1) of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse, before being amended by Act No. 15352, Jan. 6, 2018, stipulates that a person who was sentenced to imprisonment or medical treatment and custody for a sex offense against a child or juvenile or a sex offense against an adult (hereinafter referred to as “sex offense”) shall not operate a facility, an institution, or a place of business (hereinafter referred to as “child or juvenile-related institution, etc.”) under any of the following subparagraphs, or shall not provide employment or actual labor to a child or juvenile-related institution, etc., uniformly set the period during which it is impossible to provide its operation, employment, or actual labor (hereinafter referred to as “period of employment restriction”).

However, Article 56 of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse, which was amended by Act No. 15352 and enforced July 17, 2018, and enforced as of July 17, 2018, and Article 56 (1) of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles against Sexual Abuse, where a court declares a sentence or medical treatment and custody for sex crimes, it shall, by judgment, pronounce an order to operate child and juvenile-related institutions, etc. during the period of restriction on employment or to prevent them from providing employment or actual labor to children and juveniles-related institutions, etc. (hereinafter referred to as “order for restriction on employment”) upon the judgment of the