The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

1. The summary of the grounds for appeal is the part of the land that prevents the passage of vehicles by the Defendant from drinking water or piling up soil and sand (including part of the land in strike C and D), which is used by L, etc. to pass through the factory direction on the land in J, G, or K by using container vehicles.

Although the part of the instant land is not a passage to and from the general public, it is nothing more than that the P, the owner of J’s land, has used concrete packaging on November 21, 2006 and used it as a passage (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2014Da17636, Feb. 2, 2015). Therefore, on the premise that the instant part of land constitutes “land” as referred to in Article 185 of the Criminal Act, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine.

2. The judgment of the court below is an offense of interference with general traffic under Article 185 of the Criminal Act, which is a legal interest in protecting the traffic safety of the general public. The phrase "land passage" refers to the wide passage of land that is actually common use for the traffic of the general public. The ownership relation of the site, the relation of the traffic and the right and the right of passage, or the filling of snow, etc. do not prevent (see Supreme Court Decisions 99Do1651 delivered on July 27, 1999; 2001Do6903 delivered on April 26, 2002, etc.). The part of the land of this case, which was recognized by the evidence duly adopted and investigated by the court below, is, from around 2008, L, which is, from among others, leased a J-owned warehouse to P from 208 to 2008, the part of the land of this case, which was sufficiently connected to the above concrete portion of the land of this case, which was 1.6.