1. All appeals filed by the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) are dismissed.

2. The appeal cost is borne by the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff).

The reasoning of the first instance judgment is reasonable, and this is the same as the examination of the witness H’s testimony by the appellate court along with the evidence submitted by the first instance court. As such, this is based on this judgment pursuant to the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act, and below, the Defendants’ repeated or added arguments at the appellate

The Defendants asserted that the Defendants violated the Insurance Business Act by explaining to the Defendants that “A representative director D of the CFinancial Corporation, which was the Plaintiff’s insurance solicitor, can receive support from the insurance company equivalent to three times the monthly insurance premium if they subscribed to each of the instant insurance products, and the insurance premium is recognized to pay corporate tax reduction or exemption, and the Defendants may terminate the insurance contract at any time during the period of the insurance contract, and even if the contract is terminated, the full amount of the insurance premium already paid may be refunded.” The Defendants concluded each of the instant insurance contracts on the grounds that they were in such fraudulent manner. As such, the Plaintiff asserted that the Defendants are liable to compensate the Defendants for damages

However, according to the witness H’s testimony at the appellate court’s appellate trial, it is acknowledged that Defendant A made a demand for the payment of rebates by asking H and D first to the effect that, at the time of the conclusion of each of the instant insurance contracts, Defendant A made a statement to suggest that there had been several times the history of receiving rebates while entering into another insurance contract at the time of the conclusion of each of the instant insurance contracts, Defendant A had already been engaged in several times.

In addition, the appellate court’s witness H testified that “I had never made a statement to the Defendant A to the effect that I would like to be argued by the Defendants,” and there is no special circumstance to suspect the credibility of such testimony.

In full view of these facts recognized and the facts recognized by the reasoning of the judgment of the first instance, it shall be submitted at the first instance and the appellate court.