The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

1. The summary of the grounds for appeal (a two-year imprisonment) of the lower court’s sentencing (two-year imprisonment) is unreasonable.

2. The determination of sentencing is based on the statutory penalty, with a discretionary determination that takes place within a reasonable and appropriate scope, taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing prescribed in Article 51 of the Criminal Act, based on which our Criminal Procedure Act, which takes the trial-oriented principle and the principle of directness, has a unique area of the first instance trial regarding the

In addition, considering these circumstances and the ex post facto nature of the appellate court, it is reasonable to respect the sentencing conditions in the event that there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, and to refrain from rendering a sentence that does not differ from the first instance court on the sole ground that the sentence of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, even though the sentence of the first instance court is somewhat different from the opinion of the appellate court,

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015). In light of the following: (a) the sentencing judgment of the lower court does not seem to have exceeded a reasonable scope of discretion; and (b) the sentencing judgment of the lower court is reasonable in view of the following: (a) the circumstance favorable to the sentencing asserted in the trial by the Defendant, including the fact that the Defendant was led to confession and reflect against a criminal act; (c) the Defendant had been sentenced to criminal punishment for driving without a driver’s license even before the instant case; (d) the Defendant had been sentenced to suspended sentence due to the crime of violation of the Road Traffic Act, and (e) was driving again for 70,00 days; and (e) the blood alcohol content without a driver’s license reaches 0.140% of the blood alcohol content without a driver’s license; and (e) the lower court’s sentencing judgment does not seem to have exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion; and (e) there was no particular change in the situation

Therefore, the defendant.