1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.

1. The reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance cited by the court of first instance is the same as the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, and thus, citing the same as it is in accordance with

[In full view of all evidence submitted to the court of first instance and witness F, G, and E at the court of first instance, G lent and used the expense necessary for the construction of pentol in F through F, and the establishment of the instant right to collateral security. At the time, G used the instant right to collateral security in E as security because it is not good credit standing, and at the time, it was recognized that the establishment of the instant right to collateral security was set up by E with E as the obligor. The existence of the right to collateral security in the establishment of the instant right to collateral security was sufficiently proven (the Plaintiff’s testimony of witness F at the court of first instance is difficult to believe, and therefore, it is unreasonable in the first instance judgment on the ground that the existence of the right to collateral security in the establishment of the instant right to collateral security in the instant case is reasonable. However, F’s testimony is consistent with the details and substitution of the deposit transaction indicated in the evidence 13-1 and 2.

In addition, the Plaintiff asserts that the registration of creation of a neighboring mortgage in the instant case was made without the consent of E, by asserting that it is different from the registration certificate of No. 6 in the written confirmation in lieu of the registration certificate of No. 6. The Plaintiff asserted that the registration of establishment of a neighboring mortgage in the instant case was made without the consent of E. However, in light of the fact that G was seen to have frequently used the name of E in the construction of a pentent building, or that both the power of attorney used at the time of the establishment of a right to collateral security and the written contract for establishing a right to collateral security have affixed the seal of E, even if it is assumed that the E-friendly person of No.

[2] In conclusion, the judgment of the court of first instance is legitimate. Thus, the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.