In case where the original owner has made a registration of preservation of ownership after the completion of the statute of limitations, whether the third person who has a new interest is the title holder of registration after the completion of the statute of limitations.

In a case where the Plaintiff received a donation from the owner of unregistered real estate on or around 1913, while the Defendant occupied the said real estate from around 1928 and completed the prescriptive acquisition on or around 1948, and the Plaintiff completed a preservation of ownership on the said real estate in its name on May 10, 1968, the Plaintiff would be deemed as the owner of the said real estate from the beginning of possession, which serves as the basis for the prescriptive acquisition, and even if the preservation of ownership was completed after the expiration of the statute of limitations, the Plaintiff cannot be deemed as a third party with new interest after the expiration of the statute of limitations, and thus, the Defendant is obliged to implement the procedure for the registration

Article 245 of the Civil Act

D. D. D. S. S. S. S. S. S. S. S.

Korean Uniforms Sheet

1. The plaintiff (Counterclaim defendant)'s main claim is dismissed.

2. The Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) performed the procedure for the registration of ownership transfer due to the completion of the prescriptive acquisition on the date and on the basis of the expiration of the prescriptive acquisition on the date of 1948 with respect to the amount between 64 and 734, Dongdaemun-gu, Seoul.

3. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by all the principal lawsuit and counterclaims against the plaintiff.

The Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant; hereinafter the Plaintiff) is the principal lawsuit, and the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff; hereinafter the Defendant) collects 145 percent of pine trees, which are planted in the land indicated in the order (hereinafter the “instant land”) to the Plaintiff, and delivers the same land.

The judgment and a provisional execution declaration that the lawsuit costs shall be borne by the defendant, and the defendant, as a counterclaim, has the same judgment as that of the Disposition No. 2.

1. Determination on the main claim

On November 10, 1913, the land of this case was corrected as the owner under the Joseon Land Investigation Order and was donated to the Plaintiff Inspection on or around December 12 of the same year by the Non-party Lee Jong-gu to the Plaintiff Inspection on May 10, 1968, and the fact that the Defendant currently owned approximately KRW 145 shares on the ground and possessed and cultivated on the land is no dispute between the parties.

The grounds for the plaintiff's claim for the delivery of the land in this case and the collection of tree on its ground are based on the claim for the return of the object based on ownership and for the exclusion of disturbance. Since the defendant acquired the land in this case on the date of 1948 by prescription, it cannot respond to the plaintiff's above claim, the defendant's claim cannot be accepted as long as he acquired the land in this case on the date of the following counter-claim. As seen in the judgment as to the following counter-claim, the defendant has the right to claim for the transfer of ownership due to the completion of prescription, and the plaintiff cannot claim for the removal of disturbance on the ground of ownership of the defendant who is liable to make the transfer registration. Therefore, the defendant's defense is reasonable, and therefore, the plaintiff's claim for the principal lawsuit is based on the ground that the plaintiff's claim for

2. Determination on the claim for return

In full view of the statements in Eul evidence Nos. 1 (No. 2), 2 (No. 3 (No. 1), 1 through 8 (No. 1) of the same evidence No. 3 (No. 1) and evidence No. 1 to 3 (No. 8) of the same evidence, testimony of the same leapine, the result of the party member’s on-site verification, the result of the appraiser’s appraisal of the receipt of leapum equality, and the whole purport of the pleadings, the non-party 1 occupied the land and died on December 29, 1930. The non-party 1, who was his son, died on the same day as his heir, and died on or around April 30, 1950. The defendant, who was the wife of the above lecomumum No. 1, can independently succeed to his possession, and there is no other evidence to prove otherwise.

Thus, barring special circumstances, the above non-party Gangwon House has occupied the land of this case in a peaceful and peaceful manner from the beginning of the possession to the intention of possession. The non-party is also deemed to have continued to occupy the land of this case in a peaceful manner with the intention of possession by succeeding the possession of the above net Gangwon House as it is, and thus, it shall be deemed that the prescriptive acquisition of the land of this case was completed on the date of 1948 after the lapse of 20 years from the above occupation commencement date.

The plaintiff argues that since the possession of the land in this case was commenced upon the delegation of management by the plaintiff, the possession of the land in this case is the possession of the owner in the nature of the title, and since the non-party's rivers, who is his successor, expressed his intention to own to the plaintiff or that the defendant commenced possession with the intention to own it with a new title, the defendant's assertion of prescriptive acquisition is groundless. However, since there is no evidence to prove that the non-party's establishment of the deceased's river was possessed with the management delegation by the plaintiff, it is presumed that the possession of the above deceased's river is presumed to be possession with the intention to own the land in this case, and since the non-party's river and the defendant succeeded to the possession by inheritance, it cannot be viewed that

The plaintiff argues that the completion of the prescriptive acquisition of the land in this case is around 1948, and that the registration of preservation of ownership was completed under the name of the plaintiff on May 10, 1968, after the completion of the statute of limitations. Thus, the defendant cannot assert the acquisition by prescription against the plaintiff who acquired the registration of ownership after the completion of the statute of limitations. Thus, as seen earlier, the pre-sale relationship between the time of the completion of the statute of limitations and the time of the registration is identical to the plaintiff's assertion, but the plaintiff was donated to the non-party Lee Ho-gu, the owner of the land in this case on or around December 1913, 1913. Thus, the plaintiff was the owner of the land in this case on May 1928, when the non-party Lee Sung-dong began to acquire an autonomous fiber (the former Civil Code takes the counter-performance principle as to the acquisition of ownership) and then the registration of preservation of ownership was completed under his name on May 10, 1968.

Therefore, the plaintiff should be deemed to have been the owner of the land of this case from the beginning of possession, which is the basis for the prescriptive acquisition of the land of this case, even if the preservation of ownership has been completed after the completion of the statute of limitations, it cannot be deemed to be a third party with a new interest after the completion of the statute of limitations, and thus, the plaintiff's defense is groundless ( even if the plaintiff was temporarily owned by the defendant from the expiration of the statute of limitations pursuant to Articles 8 and 10 of the Addenda of the Civil Act to December 31, 1965, even if it was owned by the defendant and temporarily from the expiration of the statute of limitations, it does not mean that the plaintiff again acquired ownership by a new juristic act

Thus, the plaintiff is obligated to implement the procedure for the transfer registration of ownership due to the completion of the acquisition by prescription on the date of 1948 for the land of this case to the defendant who is currently occupying the land as the heir of the deceased Jong-il Day.

3. Conclusion

Thus, the plaintiff's claim is dismissed unfairly, and the defendant's counterclaim is justified, and the costs of the lawsuit are assessed against the plaintiff who has lost all the main lawsuit and counterclaim. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges Lee Young-chul (Presiding Judge)