1. From January 4, 2013 to March 25, 2015, the lower court’s portion on delay damages for KRW 50,000,00.

1. The ground of appeal on the grounds of appeal argues that the Defendant did not borrow money from the Plaintiff in relation to each of the Promissory Notes in this case, and that all repayment was made even if borrowed. However, this is a matter of the selection of evidence and fact-finding, which is the exclusive authority of the lower court, which is a fact-finding court, and thus cannot be deemed a legitimate ground of appeal. In light of the record, the lower court did not err by exceeding the bounds

2. Article 3(2) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Ex officio Proceedings on Compensation for Delay Damages (hereinafter “Lawsuit Promotion Act”) provides that “Where it is deemed reasonable for an obligor to dispute over the existence of the obligation or the scope of the obligation before a fact-finding judgment declaring that the obligor has the obligation to pay damages is rendered, Article 3(1) of the Litigation Promotion Act shall not apply to the reasonable scope.”

Article 3 (2) of the Litigation Promotion Act provides that "a case where it is deemed reasonable for an obligor to dispute whether he/she has an obligation to perform or not" refers to the case where it is acknowledged that there is a reasonable ground for the obligor's argument as to the existence or scope of such obligation. Whether it is reasonable for an obligor to dispute as above is a matter of fact-finding and evaluation by the court concerning the case in question. However, if the obligor's argument was accepted in the first instance court because he/she contests the existence or scope of the obligation to perform, the argument is reasonable even if it is rejected in the appellate court. Thus, Article 3 (2) of the Litigation Promotion Act applies to such a case.