1. On October 25, 2017, the Defendant’s revocation of Class I ordinary licenses and Class II ordinary licenses for the Plaintiff.

1. Details of the disposition;

A. On February 10, 2003, the Plaintiff acquired a Class II ordinary driver’s license, and Class I ordinary driver’s license on February 25, 2010. On October 13, 201, the Plaintiff: (a) driven a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol of 0.067%; (b) was subject to the disposition of suspension of the said driver’s license on September 17, 201; (c) on September 22 and 42, 2017, the Plaintiff was under the influence of alcohol of 0.104% on the Central Highway at the Busan At the end of 372km, the Plaintiff was under the influence of alcohol of 0.104% on the B SP motor vehicle at the speed of 50km.

B. On October 18, 2017, the Defendant rendered a disposition to revoke the driver’s license stated in the preceding paragraph as of November 20, 2017 (hereinafter “instant disposition”) by applying Article 93(1)1 of the Road Traffic Act due to the drunk driving as stated in the preceding paragraph to the Plaintiff.

C. The Plaintiff appealed and filed an administrative appeal with the Central Administrative Appeals Commission, but was dismissed on December 22, 2017.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 1, 2, Eul evidence 1 to 12, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. We examine the legality of the instant disposition, since the Plaintiff alleged that there was an error in the abuse of discretion or discretion.

A. Whether a punitive administrative disposition deviates from or abused the scope of discretion by social norms should be determined by comparing and balancing the degree of infringement of public interest and the disadvantages suffered by an individual as well as the degree of infringement of public interest by objectively examining the content of the violation, which is the reason for the disposition, and the public interest to be achieved by

(See Supreme Court Decision 98Du11779 delivered on April 7, 200, etc.). B.

The fact that the plaintiff was driving under the influence of alcohol of this case is recognized as seen earlier.

However, the following facts and circumstances, i.e., the recognition of Gap evidence Nos. 3 through 21, 22-1 through 5, 23, 24, and 25, which are acknowledged by considering the overall purport of the pleadings, are as follows.