1. The Defendant Republic of Korea confirms that the 797 square meters of the maintenance B in Gyeongsan-si is owned by Defendant A.

2. Defendant A shall be the Plaintiff.

1. Facts of recognition;

A. The real estate indicated in the Disposition No. 1 (hereinafter “instant real estate”) is an unregistered real estate that Defendant A had not been registered as an unregistered real estate on or around November 25, 1911.

B. Since around 1943, the Gyeongsan Farmland Improvement Cooperatives incorporated the instant real estate into the maintenance road of C reservoir and used it as the maintenance and piling of C reservoir from that time.

C. The Plaintiff comprehensively succeeded to the rights and obligations of the Gyeongsan Farmland Improvement Association.

[Ground for Recognition: Facts without dispute, entries in Gap evidence 1 through 4, video, purport of whole pleadings]

2. Determination on the legitimacy of a lawsuit

A. The Defendant Republic of Korea claimed that Defendant A received the assessment of the instant real estate around November 25, 1911, and that Defendant A had already died, and thus, Defendant A’s claim seeking confirmation of ownership of the deceased does not have any benefit of confirmation.

B. In general, barring any special circumstance, it is reasonable to presume that the plaintiff's life is presumed that the defendant or the person under subrogation, etc., who is the plaintiff's life is an actual life and that the person under subrogation is alive, unless there are special circumstances. Thus, in a creditor subrogation lawsuit, unless there are special circumstances, the plaintiff's life is presumed to be the actual life of the person under subrogation, and it is extremely rare for the plaintiff to live until he/she reaches his/her age. Thus, unless there are special circumstances, the person under subrogation is presumed to be currently alive, and the defendant must actively prove that he/she died.

Comprehensively taking account of the aforementioned evidence, Defendant A is recognized as having received an assessment of the instant real estate on or around November 25, 191, but no evidence exists as to when Defendant A was born at any time.