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(영문) 서울고등법원 2020.02.21 2019나2048678
공제금
Text

1. The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.

Purport of claim and appeal

1..

Reasons

1. The reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance that accepted the judgment is as follows: (a) each “2018” of the six pages and eight lines of the judgment of the court of first instance shall be deemed to be “208”; (b) the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance shall be deemed to be “C”; and (c) Defendant C shall be deemed to be “B”; and (d) the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance shall be as stated in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for a supplementary or supplementary decision as described in paragraph (2) with respect to the part claimed by the Defendant

(other than the determination of claims against co-defendant B of the first instance trial). 2. Additional or supplementary determination

A. The summary of the grounds of appeal 1) The Plaintiff’s claim for mutual aid money is not a claim for damages on the grounds of tort. Thus, the time when the Plaintiff knew or could have known of the tort committed by the Plaintiff, a licensed real estate agent, should not be considered as the time when the Plaintiff knew or could have known of the accident. 2) The Plaintiff concluded the instant sales contract with the expectation that the land in this case is G’s ownership, and the Plaintiff would be entitled to transfer its ownership from his heir, but the Plaintiff and seven other parties concluded the instant sales contract on June 25, 2014, which was the date of the instant sales contract, by completing the registration of ownership transfer on the grounds of prescriptive acquisition, thereby making it impossible to acquire the ownership of

As such, inasmuch as the Plaintiff was damaged by C’s brokerage act, it can be deemed that the accident of mutual aid occurred, and the Plaintiff filed a complaint against C around August 2016, which became aware of, and thus, it should be deemed that the Plaintiff knew or could have known that the accident of mutual aid occurred.

3. Therefore, the end of August 2016, which the plaintiff became aware of the occurrence of the accident, should be considered as the starting point of the extinctive prescription.

However, since the lawsuit of this case was filed two years after the lapse of the two years thereafter, the plaintiff's claim for mutual aid amount is completed by prescription.

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