The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Daejeon High Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. The court below, citing the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, found that the dismissal disposition of this case against the plaintiff was unlawful since it abused the discretionary authority on the ground that the dismissal disposition of this case against the plaintiff exceeded the discretionary authority on the ground that it is difficult to view that the plaintiff had sexual intercourse with the subordinate C by using his superior status or force, except for the grounds for aggravated punishment under the disciplinary provision, he faithfully served for about 15 years, and received approximately 46 official commendation while his spouse wanted to be dismissed.

2. However, such determination by the lower court on the determination of disciplinary action is difficult to accept for the following reasons.

When a disciplinary measure is taken against a person subject to disciplinary action, it is at the discretion of the person having authority to take the disciplinary measure. However, the disciplinary measure is unlawful only when it is deemed that the person having authority to take the disciplinary measure has abused the person having authority to take the disciplinary measure since the disciplinary measure as the exercise of authority has considerably lost validity under the social norms. In order for the disciplinary measure to have remarkably lost validity under the social norms, the disciplinary measure should be determined by considering various factors, such as the content and nature of the wrongful act causing the disciplinary measure, administrative purpose to be achieved by the disciplinary measure, criteria for the determination of disciplinary measure, etc., and where it can be objectively and objectively deemed that the contents of the disciplinary measure

(see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 95Nu18727, Apr. 26, 1996; 201Du29540, Feb. 27, 2014). (B)

According to the reasoning of the first instance judgment cited by the lower court and the evidence adopted by the lower court, the following facts are revealed.

1. On March 1, 200, the Plaintiff was in the Army Second Lieutenant, and thereafter, was from January 2, 2014 to January 30, 2015, the 11th Mechanical Fire Service Corps of the Army.