1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Purport of claim and appeal

The first instance court.

1. Details of the disposition;

A. The Plaintiff, on April 1970, acquired the land of Gangdong-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government 5136 square meters and C miscellaneous land of 990 square meters (hereinafter “instant land”), but transferred the land on January 31, 201.

B. On March 25, 2011, the Plaintiff cut down the instant land for at least eight years with respect to the transfer of the instant land, and applied Article 69 of the former Restriction of Special Taxation Act (amended by Act No. 11133, Dec. 31, 2011; hereinafter the same) to the Defendant, the Plaintiff paid KRW 94,483,930, capital gains tax when filing a preliminary return on the tax base of capital gains on the transfer income reverted to year 2011.

C. On February 2, 2015, the Defendant notified the Plaintiff that the instant land was directly cultivated for at least eight years, and that the instant land constitutes land for non-business use, and that the Defendant additionally paid KRW 488,307,360 (including general underreported penalty tax of KRW 12,848,927, and penalty tax of KRW 142,490,327) for the transfer income tax for self-owned farmland and special deduction for long-term possession, which reverts to the Plaintiff for the year 2015.

(hereinafter “instant disposition”) D.

On April 29, 2015, the Plaintiff appealed to the Tax Tribunal, but was dismissed on September 21, 2015.

[Reasons for Recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap 1, 6, 7, 10 evidence, Eul 1 and 2 evidence (including each number), the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the disposition is lawful;

A. The Plaintiff’s assertion (the claim regarding reduction and exemption of capital gains tax on self-arable land is withdrawn) was that the land category of the instant land was a miscellaneous land, a special-purpose area was an urban area (quasi-residential area) or an urban area (natural green belt area), but it became impossible to construct it as it was designated as a development restriction zone around July 30, 1971, which was after the Plaintiff’s acquisition, and thus, it became inevitable for the Plaintiff to do so. As such, it was based on the law after acquiring the “land” under Article 104-3(2) of the former Income Tax Act (amended by Act No. 10625, May 2, 201).