1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

1. In the course of the disposition, the following facts: short-term stay status (C-3) on July 3, 2015, the date of entry into the Republic of Korea of the Republic of Uzbekistan (hereinafter “instant disposition”) on the date of application for refugee status recognition (hereinafter “instant disposition”) on the date of February 15, 2016, the date of the application for refugee status recognition (hereinafter “application for refugee status recognition”): The fact that there is no dispute over the grounds of recognition of the decision to dismiss the decision on May 13, 2016 on the date of application for objection that the decision cannot be sufficiently based on the grounds of refugee status recognition: the fact that there is no ground of recognition of the decision to dismiss the decision on December 22, 2016, Gap’s evidence Nos. 1, 2, Eul evidence Nos. 1 and 2

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The plaintiff's assertion is a national of the Republic of Uzbekistan (hereinafter referred to as "Izkman").

The father of the plaintiff was killed by the business beecker on the ground that he is a kyke.

The plaintiff also entered the Republic of Korea regardless of having been threatened by his father, such as his father.

As such, if the Plaintiff returned to Uzbekistan, it is likely that the Plaintiff might be stuffed on the ground that the nation differs, and thus, the Plaintiff ought to be recognized as a refugee.

B. Determination 1) Article 2 Subparag. 1 of the Refugee Act defines refugee status as “a foreigner who is unable to be protected or does not want to be protected by the country of nationality due to well-founded fear to recognize that he/she may be injured on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, status as a member of a specific social group, or political opinion, or a stateless foreigner who, due to such fear, could not return to, or does not want to return to, the country of nationality before entering the Republic of Korea.” 2) The aforementioned evidence and the statement in the evidence No. 3 reveal the following circumstances that can be known in addition to the purport of the pleading as a whole, the Plaintiff can be seen as “a well-founded fear of being injured on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a specific social group, or political opinion.”