The judgment of the court below is reversed.

A defendant shall be punished by imprisonment with prison labor for up to six months.

Each bicycle seized (Evidence No. 3-29).

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. The sentence of the lower court (six months of imprisonment) is too unreasonable.

B. The Prosecutor’s sentence of the lower court is too unhued and unreasonable.

2. We examine ex officio prior to the judgment on the grounds for ex officio appeal.

Article 33(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that “The head of a Si/Gun/Gu shall return the seized stolen articles to the victim by means of a judgment (Article 333(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act).” According to the evidence duly admitted and examined by the court below, each bicycle set forth in subparagraphs 3 through 29 of the evidence seized by the defendant is a stolen stolen articles, such as the daily list Nos. 2-6, 8-27, 30, and 31 of the crime committed in the judgment of the court below, and the reason for returning the victim’s name to each victim is clear. If an investigative agency sells seized stolen articles and keeps the seized proceeds, they are the same as the seized stolen articles, and thus, they are not the subject of return to the victim, not the delivery to the victim (see Supreme Court Decision 65Do493, Aug. 24, 1965). The court below omitted the aforementioned bicycle or its respective proceeds from return to the victim’s name by means of a judgment under Article 333(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is erroneous in violation of Article 333 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, which affected the judgment.

3. In our criminal litigation law, which takes the principle of court-oriented and direct determination of the unfair argument of sentencing by the defendant and the prosecutor, has a unique area for sentencing determination by the first instance court. In addition, in light of the ex post facto core nature of the appellate court, if there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the first instance court, and the sentencing by the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of the discretion, it is reasonable to respect such a case. Although the first instance sentencing is within the reasonable scope of the discretion, the judgment of the first instance court is reversed solely on the ground that it is somewhat different from the opinion of the appellate court.