The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

1. The summary of the grounds for appeal (e.g., imprisonment) of the lower court’s sentencing (e., one year of imprisonment) is too unreasonable.

2. The determination of sentencing is based on the statutory penalty, with a discretionary determination that takes place within a reasonable and appropriate scope, taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing prescribed in Article 51 of the Criminal Act, based on which our Criminal Procedure Act, which takes the trial-oriented principle and the principle of directness, has a unique area of the first instance trial regarding the

In addition, considering these circumstances and the ex post facto nature of the appellate court, it is reasonable to respect the sentencing conditions in the event that there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance court does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, and to refrain from rendering a sentence that does not differ from the first instance court on the sole ground that the sentence of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, even though the sentence of the first instance court is somewhat different from the opinion of the appellate court,

(2) On July 23, 2015, the lower court rendered the aforementioned sentence to the Defendant on grounds of sentencing as indicated in its reasoning. In so doing, the lower court did not err by exceeding the reasonable scope of discretion, in light of the following: (a) the circumstance favorable to sentencing asserted in the trial by the Defendant, such as the confession and reflecting of the Defendant; (b) the Defendant, even before the instant case, was sentenced to criminal punishment due to drinking driving, has already been determined by the lower court; (c) once again, he/she had been under the influence of criminal punishment; (d) even if the Defendant was found to have been under the influence of drinking on or around June 6, 2020, even if he/she was discovered to have been under the influence of drinking on or around June 7, 2020; (d) the blood alcohol content was driving twice at a full-time, which reaches 0.154% and 177%; and (e) the driving distance was not exceeded by the lower court’s reasonable scope of discretion.