The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the Plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed).

1. The closing date of the collaborative act Nos. 1 and 2 of the instant case (Ground of appeal No. 1)

Where there was an agreement on price determination, etc. under Article 19 (1) 1 of the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Fair Trade Act") and an action based on such agreement, it refers to the date on which the unfair collaborative act is terminated, not to the date on which the agreement was concluded, but to the

(See Supreme Court Decision 2004Du11275 Decided March 24, 2006). Such a legal doctrine applies to the bid collusion on the determination of successful bidders, successful bidders, and bid price under Article 19(1)8 of the Fair Trade Act, and the case where there was a practice based thereon.

Whether the action based on bid collusion has been terminated shall be determined individually and specifically on the basis of the contents of the agreement in question, comprehensively considering various factors, such as the specific scope and attitude of the intended action and the occurrence of the effect of restricting competition in accordance with the agreement, etc.

(See Supreme Court Decision 2015Du37396 Decided May 28, 2015). B.

The lower court determined as follows.

On February 11, 2010, the parties to the agreement in 2009 of the instant case, including the Plaintiff, etc., continued to hold a competitive bid ordered by the Korea Land Information Institute on February 11, 201 and completed the implementation based on bid collusion.

The instant collaborative act was completed on March 17, 201 by the parties to the instant agreement, including the Plaintiff, etc., on March 17, 2011, through competitive bidding ordered by the Korea Land Information Institute, and the implementation based on bid collusion was completed.

C. Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the foregoing legal doctrine and the record, the lower court’s judgment did not exhaust all necessary deliberations and limits of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules.