2013Guhap 13617 Deportation order and revocation of protection order

**** (Roland***********************10

Yeongdeungpo-gu Seoul

Attorney Seo-chul et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Head of Seoul Immigration Office

For the lectures of litigation performers, Kim Jong-Un

September 12, 2013

October 10, 2013

1. On February 22, 2012, the Defendant’s deportation order and protection order issued against the Plaintiff is revoked.

2. The costs of the lawsuit shall be borne by the defendant.

The order is as set forth in the text.

1. Details of the disposition;

A. The Plaintiff is a member of a minority-national friendship (Chin) with the nationality of Myanmar, and on June 16, 201.

After entering the short-term visit (C-3) sojourn status, the Defendant filed an application for refugee status with the Defendant on the 28th of the same month, and the Defendant accordingly changed the Plaintiff’s sojourn status to other (G - 1) qualification granted to the refugee applicant on the 30th of the same month.

B. From August 5, 2012 to the 20th day of the same month, the Plaintiff was discovered to be engaged in simple labor by receiving 60,000 won daily remuneration from the Defendant from ○○ enterprise located in Geumcheon-gu Seoul to the 21st day of the same month. The Defendant: (a) on August 21, 2012, the Plaintiff’s act of the Plaintiff violated Article 18(1) of the Immigration Control Act; (b) in consideration of the first fact, the Plaintiff issued a notice of KRW 1 million of penalty pursuant to Articles 94 Subparag. 8 and 102(1) of the Immigration Control Act; and (c) thereafter, (d) on the 22th day of the same month, the Plaintiff permitted ○ enterprise to engage in job-seeking activities from the same day to December 28, 2012.

C. On November 13, 2012, the Defendant: (a) did not engage in any activity opposing the Plaintiff’s government; (b) did not have been subject to surveillance, arrest, detention, etc. from its government; (c) was restored to multilateral parliamentary politics through a general election in 2010; and (d) was taking a series of democratization measures to be taken, such as the release of all political offenders and the permission for peaceful demonstration, etc. after the public election in 2010; and (c) was recently taking measures to prevent political persecution; and (d) was determined to be not a refugee as it is not likely to be harmful to the political situation of the Myanmar; and (e) the Plaintiff filed an objection with the Minister of Justice on December 24 of the same year and is currently under examination.

D. On December 24, 2012, the Plaintiff applied for the extension of the period of stay and the extension of the permission to engage in activities outside the status of stay to the Defendant. The Defendant made a decision to extend the Plaintiff’s period of stay to March 28, 2013 on the same day, but the extension of the permission to engage in activities outside the status of stay was denied on January 4, 2013.

E. On February 21, 2013, the Plaintiff continued to work for ○○ Company after the period of permission for activities outside the status of stay expires. Upon re-explosion on February 21, 2013, the Defendant, on the 22th of the same month, violated Article 18(1) of the Immigration Control Act and issued a deportation order and a protection order pursuant to Articles 46(1)8 and 63(1) of the same Act (hereinafter collectively referred to as “instant disposition”).

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The parties' assertion (1) not only are the process of review of objection against the current disposition of non-recognition of refugee status, but also the situation that the Korean government does not have any livelihood support even if the long-term requirement for refugee screening and therefore makes it inevitable for the refugee applicant to continue his/her livelihood. The defendant asserts that the defendant's compulsory departure order is unlawful because it deviates from the scope of discretion or abused discretionary power, and that the protection order premised on the compulsory departure order is also unlawful. (2) The defendant asserts that the plaintiff's unlawful employment order was discovered on August 20, 2012 and received a disposition of notice from the defendant, and thus, it again engages in illegal employment without prejudice, and that the plaintiff is in a position of the refugee applicant, even if he/she is in a position of the refugee or refugee applicant, it is possible to enforce the refugee departure order within the scope of Article 33 of the Refugee Convention if he/she violates the domestic law of the country, and that the defendant's voluntary departure order may not be seen as having been in a situation where he/she is unable to enjoy the refugee status or the defendant's right of temporary release after the procedure.

B. Relevant statutes

As shown in the attached Form.

C. Determination

(1) Whether the deportation order is unlawful

Comprehensively taking account of the following circumstances: (a) the Defendant unilaterally emphasizes only the date of administration and convenience of refugee applicants and neglected their human dignity on the grounds that it did not extend the period of validity after one year has elapsed from the date of application for refugee status to the Plaintiff who is a refugee applicant without providing assistance to the Contracting State; (b) Article 192 (vi) of the former Immigration Control Act (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Justice No. 196) (hereinafter referred to as the “Refugee”) provides that the applicant shall be granted refugee status 2 to the Contracting State in accordance with the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol; (c) Article 192 (i) of the 196 Convention on the Status of Refugees (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Justice No. 1); and (d) Article 2 of the 196 Convention on the Status of Refugees to the extent that the applicant is not clearly abused by a superior administrative agency or court; and (d) Article 3 of the 196 Convention on the Protection of Refugees’s Status should be recognized as a technical Guidelines of the United Nations.

In addition, prior to the enactment of the Refugee Act by Act No. 11298 on February 10, 2012 and the enforcement of July 1, 2013, the Korean government did not provide any livelihood support to refugee applicants. In this situation, denying all of job-seeking activities is entirely entrusted with the survival of refugee applicants to the group of non-government organizations or self-government organizations that provide refugee support and self-government organizations that provide refugee applicants with refugee support, and thus, it goes against the constitutional spirit of the literacy country that should protect human dignity and guarantee their right to life.

C. Article 40 of the Refugee Act and Articles 17 and 18 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act provide that refugee applicants may be provided with living expenses, etc. within six months from the date of application for refugee status, and where six months have passed from the date of application for refugee status, refugee applicants may be granted employment permission by means of permission for activities other than sojourn status under Article 20 of the Immigration Control Act. This is due to anti-sexual consideration of the problems in the past legislation related to refugee status, which, without livelihood support, has been extremely limited since one year from the date of application for refugee status, for refugee applicants without livelihood support, from the date of application for refugee status. Although Article 2 of the Addenda of the Refugee Act provides that "this Act applies from the first application for refugee status after this Act enters into force, it is necessary to practically compile and allocate budget support, such as living expenses, and thus, the purport of setting the preparation period for support activities, such as living expenses, is not to grant refugee applicants a good living permit prior to his/her livelihood support, and the purport of this provision is not to enforce the refugee law.

D. The above irregularities, like the Plaintiff, have been determined more than one year after filing an application for refugee status as in the case of the Plaintiff, and even if the Minister of Justice raises an objection to the Minister of Justice, a serious number of persons abusing the application for refugee status with intent to extend the period of domestic stay even if the applicant is not an actual refugee, is in fact a situation in which one of the main causes is an administrative body. This is one of such administrative bodies. Since such administrative body does not cause a good refugee, the issue of prolonged period is not to be returned to the disadvantage of the applicant for refugee status. The issue of abuse of the application for refugee status should be prevented by significantly reducing the period of review by expanding the period of review by providing other institutional complementary devices, and preventing the benefits from abuse of the refugee status. The presumption that the refugee status of the application for refugee status is not a refugee until the time of refugee status is recognized, making it impossible to work without livelihood support without any benefit from the protection of good refugee status does not exceed the duty of justice or justice.

E) Comprehensively taking account of the purport of the entire arguments in Gap evidence Nos. 3 through 9, 13 through 20, pro-in met may not be concluded to have abused the plaintiff's application for refugee status until he or she completed his or her obligation to file a formal objection and disposition against the plaintiff, even if the defendant's refusal to file a formal objection and disposition against the plaintiff, he or she could not be deemed to have abused his or her right to stay in the Republic of Korea until he or she completed his or her litigation procedures, unless special circumstances exist.

F) Although Article 62(4)2 of the former Immigration Control Act does not enforce a deportation order against the Plaintiff under Article 62(2) for the sake of respecting Article 33 of the Refugee Convention until the enforcement of the said order is terminated, the illegality of the deportation order itself is not cured solely based on the postponement of enforcement pursuant to the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes. (In addition, the Defendant does not specifically state whether the enforcement of the deportation order will be postponed until the period during which the appeal procedure is pending, and the same can be understood to the effect that if it is not recognized as a refugee in the procedure of raising an objection, it may be enforced unless there is a separate court’s decision regarding the enforcement of the deportation order. However, the issue of whether the enforcement of the deportation order is likely to be delayed or not is likely to be delayed even if the applicant is waiting for the result of raising an objection against the non-existence of the refugee status under Article 62(4)2 of the former Immigration Control Act.

(2) Whether the protective order is unlawful

To the extent that the deportation order against the plaintiff is unlawful as seen above, the protection order against the plaintiff is also unlawful.

3. Conclusion

The plaintiff's claim is justified and all the costs of lawsuit are assessed against the losing defendant. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Judges in charge of the presiding judge

Judges' superior ethics

Judges Yoon Jin-jin

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.