The plaintiff's primary claim is dismissed.

Defendant B, C, D, E, and F shall be attached to the Plaintiff from among the real estate listed in the attached Table 1 list.

1. Case summary and judgment

A. The facts constituting the grounds for the attachment are either in dispute between the parties or in the entry in Gap evidence 1 to 12 (including the paper number), with a comprehensive consideration of the overall purport of the pleadings.

B. The Plaintiff’s primary claim is based on the date Q Q and the network R on the real estate listed in the separate sheet No. 1 (hereinafter “instant real estate”) and the sales contract and the network R on June 29, 1994 by the deceased (former representative of the Plaintiff) and the deceased Q’s heir (Defendant B, C, D, E, and F) against the deceased’s heir (Defendant G, H, I, J, J, K, L, M, N,O,O, and P) on the registration of the instant real estate. The purport of the Plaintiff’s primary claim is to seek implementation of the Plaintiff’s ownership transfer registration procedure on behalf of the deceased’s heir (Defendant G, H, I, J, K, K, M, N,O, P, and directly against the deceased’s heir in the future.

However, the plaintiff's assertion itself is not a party to the sales contract with the network (the plaintiff's clan was not yet constituted at the time of conclusion of the sales contract with the network and S). Thus, the plaintiff's primary claim is without merit, unless there is any specific assertion or proof as to the right to seek the implementation of the above procedure for the registration of ownership transfer against the defendants (e.g., the deceased R (or its heir), the network S (or its heir), and the plaintiff's heir, etc.).

C. Meanwhile, as seen earlier, the Plaintiff occupied the instant real estate from the end of July 1994, and such possession of the Plaintiff is presumed to have been carried out in good faith, peace, and public performance with its own intent (Article 197 of the Civil Act). Thus, while the nominal owner of the instant land has been equally maintained before the commencement of the Plaintiff’s possession, it is related to the instant real estate from May 1, 1999, which was the initial date of the possession of the Plaintiff’s assertion, to the point of May 1, 2019 after the lapse of 20 years from May 1, 2019.