The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. The sentence of the lower court’s unfair sentencing (two years and six months of imprisonment, three years of suspended execution, and forty hours of lectures to treat sexual assault) is deemed unreasonable.

B. It is unreasonable for the lower court to exempt the Defendant from issuing and notifying the disclosure order of personal information, even in the absence of special circumstances that may not disclose or notify the Defendant’s personal information, which is improper to exempt the Defendant from disclosure order or notification order.

2. Determination

A. As to the unfair argument of sentencing, the sentencing is based on the statutory penalty, and the discretionary judgment is made within a reasonable and appropriate scope, taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing as prescribed in Article 51 of the Criminal Act, based on the statutory penalty. In our criminal litigation law, which adopts the trial-oriented principle and the principle of directness, there exists a unique area of deliberation in sentencing

In addition, in light of these circumstances and the ex post facto in-depth nature of the appellate court, it is reasonable to respect the sentencing in the event that there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance court, and the sentencing of the first instance does not deviate from the reasonable scope of the discretion. Although the sentence of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of the discretion, it is desirable to refrain from reversal of the first instance judgment on the sole ground that the sentence of the first instance falls within the scope of the discretion, and to impose a sentence that does not differ from the appellate court’s view (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). Since new materials on sentencing have not been submitted in the health department and the appellate court’s trial, there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the lower court’s judgment, and even considering the reasons for the sentencing stated by the lower court, it is not recognized that the sentencing of the lower court exceeded the reasonable scope of the discretion by putting too un

Therefore, this part of the prosecutor's argument cannot be accepted.

B. Article 47(1) and Article 49(1) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Punishment, etc. of Sexual Crimes with respect to unfair claims for exemption from disclosure and notification orders.