Text
The appeal is dismissed.
Reasons
1. As to the primary facts charged, the prosecutor tried to institute a prosecution by applying Articles 3(1) and 2(1)1 of the former Punishment of Violences, etc. Act (amended by Act No. 7891, Mar. 24, 2006; Act No. 12896, Dec. 30, 2014; hereinafter "the Punishment of Violences Act"), Article 283(1) of the Criminal Act, and Article 283(1) of the Criminal Act with regard to intimidation of carrying dangerous items, which are the primary facts charged of the instant case, on the grounds stated in its reasoning, and the lower court upheld the first instance judgment that acquitted the Defendant on the grounds that there is no proof of a crime regarding the primary facts charged.
However, after the judgment of the court below was rendered, the Constitutional Court rendered a decision of unconstitutionality on the part concerning "a person who commits a crime under Articles 260 (1), 283 (1), and 366 of the Criminal Act by carrying a deadly weapon or other dangerous object" in Article 3 (1) of the Punishment of Violences Act (the Constitutional Court rendered a decision of unconstitutionality as to "a person who commits a crime under Articles 260 (1), 283 (1), and 366 of the Criminal Act by carrying a deadly weapon or other dangerous object" (the Constitutional Court rendered a decision of unconstitutionality as to September 24, 2015, 2015, 3, 2015Hun-Ba154, 2015, 14, 2015Hun-Ga18, 200, and 25 (combined) of the Criminal Act). Accordingly, the aforementioned provision of the Act retroactively loses its effect pursuant to
In addition, when the penal law or the legal provision becomes retroactively null and void due to the decision of unconstitutionality, the defendant's case which was prosecuted by applying the relevant provision is a case that does not constitute a crime.
Meanwhile, among the primary facts charged in the instant case, the facts charged of intimidation under Article 283(1) of the Criminal Act and the facts charged of special intimidation under Article 284 of the Criminal Act are included in the facts charged. However, even if the reasoning of the lower judgment is examined based on the records, the lower court is justifiable to have determined that there was no proof of the relevant crime as to the fact that the Defendant used a dangerous object and threatened C for such reason as stated in its reasoning. In so doing