1. The defendant commended the plaintiff A, B, and C with the face value of 5,00 foot common share 1,785 won issued by each defendant.

1. Basic facts

A. The defendant introduced the long-term performance rating system is a company that operates civil engineering construction, new house construction and sale, and integrated overseas construction business.

On September 26, 2006, the defendant, through the amendment to the Personnel Management Regulations for Executive Directors (hereinafter referred to as the "Personnel Management Regulations"), prepared the following guidelines for the long-term performance of executive directors:

The long-term performance rating under Article 2 (Definitions) of the Personnel Management Regulations [Attachment 6] shall refer to remuneration paid by the company to executives who have contributed to the achievement of the vision and the long-term performance of the company.

Article 5 (Establishment of Long-Term Performance Objectives) (1) The objective of long-term performance shall be set as a measurable item as an exclusive objective to be achieved by the company from a long-term point of view, and shall be determined after separate approval from the board of directors

(2) Where any cause, such as takeover, merger, sale, or takeover of business, occurs during the evaluation period, or where it is deemed inevitable to change long-term and objective due to changes in other management conditions, such change may be made after obtaining approval from the board of directors.

Article 6 (Evaluation Period and Time of Implementation) The evaluation period shall be January 1, 2006 at the time of the first implementation of the long-term performance-based salary system for every three years.

Article 7 (Standards and Method of Payment) (1) In principle, long-term performance shall be paid as stocks of a company in accordance with the achievement rate of long-term performance objectives through an individual agreement between the company and each executive officer, but if the representative director deems it necessary, it may be paid in cash.

(2) Shares to be received by an executive in the event that the performance of at least 100% but less than 110% is achieved, the number of shares to be received by the executive in the event that the performance is achieved shall be double the amount of the fixed annual salary for the executive in question for the executive who is not the representative director, and four times the amount of the fixed annual salary for the representative director.

At least 130% increased by 50% compared to the total number of agreed shares, 120% or more of the total number of shares to be paid at the target achievement rate.