The judgment of the first instance shall be reversed.

Defendant shall be punished by a fine of KRW 3,000,000.

The above fine shall not be paid by the defendant.

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. There is no fact that the Defendant made a mistake of fact that he would cause harm to the victim, such as the written facts charged.

Nevertheless, the judgment of the first instance court that found the defendant guilty of the facts charged is erroneous in the misconception of facts.

B. The judgment of the court of first instance on the defendant's grounds of unfair sentencing (the fine of KRW 5,00,000) is too unreasonable.

2. Determination:

A. As to the assertion of mistake of facts, the first instance court’s determination was clearly erroneous when it was intended to re-examine the first instance court’s decision after its ex post facto determination, even though there was no new objective reason that could affect the formation of a documentary evidence in the process of the trial.

There should be reasonable grounds to deem that the argument leading to the fact-finding is remarkably unfair due to the violation of logical and empirical rules, and without such exceptional circumstances, determination as to the fact-finding of the first instance court shall not be reversed without permission (see Supreme Court Decision 2016Do18031, Mar. 22, 2017). The Defendant denies the crime with the same purport as the grounds for appeal in this part of the first instance trial after the confession of the facts charged in the court of first instance. The following circumstances acknowledged by the court of first instance by the evidence duly adopted and investigated by the court of first instance, namely, ① the confession statement that the Defendant acknowledged the Defendant’s criminal act in the court of first instance cannot be easily rejected unless there is an explanation that it would be acceptable to understand the circumstances leading to the reversal. ② The Defendant stated in the police investigation to the purport that “the fact that the Defendant was frightened, but was frightened,” and ③ the Defendant and the victim’s telephone record clearly expressed that “the Defendant clearly referred the victim to harm the Defendant.”