1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.

1. The reasoning for the court’s explanation on this part of the underlying facts is as stated in the pertinent part, except for the case where “the condition of permission” as “the condition of permission” or “the condition of permission” in the judgment of the court of first instance as “the basic facts of 1...........”

2. Summary of the plaintiff's assertion

A. The instant service contract is a contract that provides a condition to cancel the authorization within the service period, and thus, if the application for authorization is rejected without relation to the Defendant’s fault, the obligation to return the service price arises.

However, although the Defendant applied for the authorization and permission of the establishment of a factory on December 4, 2014, it was returned on January 13, 2015 and fulfilled the conditions of cancellation, the Defendant is obligated to refund the service price of KRW 88 million received from the Plaintiff and pay damages for delay.

B. Even if a conjunctive assertion is required by the Defendant’s causes attributable to the Defendant, the instant service contract was delayed due to the following reasons attributable to the Defendant, and the implementation of the contract was impossible within the service period. Thus, the Defendant shall refund the service price to the Plaintiff and pay damages for delay.

1) Although the procedure for filing an application for the abolition of the instant urban planning facility prior to the filing of the application for authorization for the instant project, the Defendant subsequently filed an application for the abolition of the instant urban planning facility. 2) Although the Plaintiff concluded the instant service contract in order to newly build a factory and a warehouse with a total of 10,000 square meters of the second and second underground floors on each of the instant lands, the Defendant was unable to receive the written consent from the residents necessary for the instant factory establishment permission within the service period, on the contrary that it was impossible for the Defendant to newly build a factory on the ground after obtaining the permission for the establishment of a factory on the ground.

In addition, February 26, 2015.