Other party to the extradition order

The other party to the order of delivery includes the specific successor and illegal occupant after the decision of permission of the auction even after the general succession after the decision of permission of the auction is made, in addition to the owner or debtor of the object of auction.

Article 647 of the Civil Procedure Act

East Maritime Industry Corporation

Other 1 et al.

Cheongju District Court Order 73Ra9 dated June 30, 1973

The reappeal is dismissed.

The first point in the grounds for reappeal is as follows:

At the time of the application for auction or the decision of approval for auction, the owner of the object of auction at the time of the application for auction and the debtor was the Taeyangyang Co., Ltd., and the re-appellant occupied the object of auction regardless of the case of this auction, so the order of delivery to the re-appellant is illegal.

Then, the other party to the order of delivery, even though the re-appellant was not the owner or debtor of the auction object at the time of the application for auction or the decision of permission of auction as discussed in this case. The other party to the order of delivery includes the general succession after the decision of permission of auction, and the specific successor and illegal possessor after the taking effect of seizure following the decision of commencement of auction. It is clear that the court of first instance and the court below made the re-appellant as the other party to the order of delivery as the other party to the order of this case constitutes one of the above-mentioned cases. If there is an objection, the court of first instance and the court of first instance should dispute at the court of first instance or the court of first instance. Accordingly, the court of first instance and the court of first instance, the fact-finding, which are the fact-finding court or the court of first instance, may not find any misunderstanding of the fact-finding or the court of first instance, which is the fact-finding court, and eventually, it is not a legitimate ground for reappeal.

The gist of the second ground for re-appeal is that the non-applicant No. 1 filed a request for auction of No. 71T36 on July 21, 1971, and this is prior to that, after the date when the decision to permit auction of the auction of the same auction subject matter became final and conclusive, the second ground for re-appeal No. 71 TT36 cannot be attached to the above 69T46, but the original decision that the attachment was lawful is a violation of law by misapprehending the legal principles as to the Auction Act and the Civil Procedure Act.

However, in the case of a voluntary auction, the buyer acquires the right to the object of auction under the condition of suspension after the decision to permit the auction becomes final and conclusive, so that the successful bidder may apply for the auction until the successful bidder pays the successful bid price, and therefore, the other person who has the right to request the auction may apply for the auction until the time the successful bidder pays the successful bid price, and therefore, it is decided by the party member's case (Supreme Court Order 72Ma507 delivered on June 21, 1972). Since the price of the auction in this case takes effect at the time of payment on July 30, 1971, the auction record applied on July 21, 1971 before the payment takes effect at the time of the payment, there is no error of law as seen above, and therefore the argument on this point is groundless.

Therefore, the reappeal is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Cho Young-young (Presiding Justice)