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The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.
Reasons
1. Summary of grounds for appeal;
A. Article 44 (2) of the Road Traffic Act provides that "If there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a driver has driven a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, etc., he/she may have a breath test whether the driver is under the influence of alcohol. In such cases, the driver shall comply with a breath test by a police officer." It is reasonable to interpret that a driver has a duty to comply with a breath test by a police officer in a case where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the driver has driven a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, etc., as well as in a case where the person under the influence of alcohol at the time of
According to the evidence, such as the statement and photograph of K and H, it is recognized that the defendant under the influence of alcohol at the time of the instant case was a situation likely to be suspected of having driven. Thus, the defendant has a duty to respond to a police officer's request for a drinking test, and as long as the defendant refused to take a drinking test, the crime of non-compliance with a drinking test is established. However, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the establishment of the crime of non-compliance with a drinking test by misapprehending the legal principles or misapprehending the
B. In light of the fact that the lower court’s judgment of not guilty on the violation of the Road Traffic Act due to the Defendant’s refusal of measurement of unfair sentencing was unreasonable, the lower court’s sentence (a fine of KRW 1.5 million) imposed by the lower court is excessively unreasonable and unfair.
2. Judgment on misconception of facts and misapprehension of legal principles
A. The summary of this part of the facts charged is as follows: (a) on March 22, 2013, the Defendant driven a vehicle of Fextonton who was parked in front of the vehicle of Fextonton who was parked in front of the vehicle of this case (hereinafter “the vehicle of this case”) at the Embur construction site adjacent to the Embur (hereinafter “instant factory”).