1. The Defendant’s executory payment order against C in the Seoul Central District Court No. 2017 tea73183 is the executory payment order.

1. On August 13, 2019, based on the executory payment order in the Seoul Central District Court case No. 2017 tea73183 against C, the Plaintiff’s spouse, the Defendant executed a seizure execution on August 13, 2019 with respect to the Suwon-gu D buildings and corporeal movables listed in the attachment list in the attached list No. 201 (hereinafter “instant corporeal movables”).

[Ground of recognition] A without dispute, entry of Gap evidence 2, purport of whole pleadings

2. Determination

A. Comprehensively taking account of the overall purport of the arguments in the evidence Nos. 1 and 3 as a whole, the Plaintiff may recognize the fact that the corporeal movables entered in the attached auction list was awarded a successful bid during the procedure for a compulsory auction by official auction by the Seoul Eastern District Court on May 8, 2014.

Property acquired by one of the married couple in his/her name during the marriage is a sole possession of the property acquired in his/her own name as a special property (Article 830(1) of the Civil Act). According to the above facts, the movable property Nos. 1 through 5, and 8 of the instant corporeal movables is a special property purchased by the plaintiff on May 8, 2014, and is a sole possession of the plaintiff. Thus, the execution against the said corporeal movables on August 13, 2019 by the defendant is unlawful as it infringes on the plaintiff's ownership.

B. Meanwhile, in order to reverse the presumption of law as above, the party asserting it must prove to the effect that the property whose belongs to one of the married couple is presumed to be jointly owned by the married couple (Article 830(2) of the Civil Act), and the corporeal movables possessed by the debtor or jointly possessed by the spouse as co-ownership of the debtor and his spouse may be seized.

(Article 190 of the Civil Execution Act). The plaintiff asserts that the remaining corporeal movables, other than Nos. 1 through 5, and 8, among the corporeal movables of this case, are the plaintiff's unique property, but the evidence submitted by the plaintiff alone is insufficient to recognize the above assertion, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it.