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1. Revocation of the first instance judgment.
2. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.
3. The total cost of the lawsuit is resulting from the supplementary participation.
Reasons
1. The court's explanation on this part of the grounds of the judgment of the court of first instance is the same as the corresponding part of the grounds of the judgment of the court of first instance. Thus, this part is cited in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main sentence of
2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful
A. The Plaintiff’s assertion 1) The instant disposition is against the principle of proportionality in that the width of the instant land is not less than four meters, and it cannot be deemed a road under the Building Act because the Mayor or the head of the Gu does not designate the road as a road. In addition, the instant land is used only as access to a building C, and it is not used for the passage of pedestrians and automobiles. In this respect, the instant land is not deemed a road under the Building Act. Furthermore, the instant disposition is in violation of the principle of proportionality in that the Plaintiff’s property right is excessively infringed due to the instant disposition. Accordingly, the instant disposition is illegal and revoked. (ii) It is recognized that there is a need for significant public interest to prevent neighboring residents from blocking their passage by constructing a new building on the instant land claimed by the Defendant, and since such a request for public interest is more important than the Plaintiff’s exercise of property right, the instant disposition is legitimate.
(b) Entry in the attached statutes of the relevant statutes;
C. After the remanding of the case, the Defendant withdrawn the previous argument that the instant land constitutes a road under the Building Act and the former Building Act. However, the Plaintiff asserted that the instant land as the cause of the claim cannot be deemed a road, and there is no ground to dispose of it, and thus, it is determined accordingly.
Although the land of this case is a "de facto road" which has been used as a passage of neighboring residents since before 1975, it constitutes a "de facto road" which has been used as a passage of neighboring residents. However, on December 31, 1975.