All judgment of the court below shall be reversed.

Defendant

A In February of 2, 200, Defendant N,O, P, and Q are punished by imprisonment for each of 8 months.

On October 12, 2015, with respect to the Defendants’ joint crimes alleged to be erroneous in the misapprehension of the facts or legal principles by the Defendants, C resigned from the office of the principal of the religious organization D (hereinafter “D”) and the president of D, an incorporated foundation, around October 12, 2015. However, C’s attempt to have C with the knowledge of the resignation of C, he/she dismissed Defendant A from the office of the secretary general of D and claimed that C had not expressed his/her intention to resign.

In other words, the Defendants did not have any awareness or intent that they are qualified as the chief director of the Incorporated Foundation D, because they appointed Defendant N as the chief director of the Incorporated Foundation D in accordance with the procedures set forth in the articles of incorporation and completed the registration, by reliance on the true intent of resignation of C.

Defendant

With respect to the forgery of resignation-related private documents and the uttering of an investigation document in the judgment of the second court with respect to the sole crime of A, each resignation in the name of C shall be made according to the intention of C, and it shall not be forged by Defendant A.

Of the lower judgment, Defendant A obtained comprehensive power of representation for the establishment of a new account by a resolution of the D board of directors on October 14, 2015, with respect to the filing of an application for a union transaction and the preparation of a private document for qualification in relation to delegation, and the use of a private document for qualification in relation to delegation. As such, Defendant A was entitled to act as an incorporated foundation D at the time of preparation of an application for a union transaction and a letter of delegation.

Even if the above resolution of the board of directors was defective and the defendant A is not entitled to act on behalf of the foundation corporation, the defendant A did not have the awareness and intent that he would be entitled to act on behalf of the foundation corporation.

Of the judgment of the court below of the second instance, with respect to embezzlement due to the refusal to return the No.N. car (hereinafter “the instant vehicle”), Defendant A paid KRW 34,812,761 in total under the name of the acquisition amount, installment, insurance premium, automobile tax, etc. of the instant vehicle, and as an incorporated foundation, the owner of the instant vehicle.