1. The remainder of the amount calculated by deducting the auction cost from the price by selling the 16m3m2 in Seo-gu, Seo-gu, Seo-gu, Seocheon-gu.

1. In the event of the establishment of the right to claim partition of co-owned property, the Plaintiff owned 33/80 shares among the land of 16 square meters in Seo-gu, Seo-gu, Seo-gu, Seoul (hereinafter “instant land”), and the Defendant owned 47/80 shares, and the fact that consultation on the method of partition between the Plaintiff and the Defendant did not lead to agreement on the method of partition may be acknowledged in full view of each entry in evidence No. 1 and No. 3,

Therefore, the Plaintiff, a co-owner, may request the Defendant to divide the land of this case, which is jointly owned.

2. In principle, the partition of co-owned property by judgment on the method of partition of co-owned property shall be made in kind as long as the share of each co-owner can be reasonably divided, or if it is impossible to divide it in kind or the value thereof might be significantly reduced due to such division, the court may order auction of the property (Article 269(2) of the Civil Act), and the requirement that "it cannot be divided in kind" is not physically strict interpretation, but it shall include cases where it is difficult or inappropriate to conduct the partition in kind in light of the nature, location, size, use status, and use value after the partition, etc. of the co-owner's share;

(2) If the value of the portion to be owned independently by the division is likely to be significantly reduced due to the division, it includes the case where the value of the portion to be owned by the owner is likely to be significantly reduced than the value of the share before the division, even if the person is a co-owner.

(2) In light of the above legal principles, the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the seizure of the Defendant’s share in the instant land, etc., and by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence, the court below erred by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence, as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal. In so doing, it did not err by misapprehending the legal principles as to the seizure of the Defendant’s share in the instant land, as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal.