The appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed).

1. Article 93(1) of the Public Official Election Act (hereinafter “the provision of this case”) limits acts relating to election is intended to pursue common interests of all the electors or all the citizens, including electors, by guaranteeing the freedom and fairness of election. Therefore, the legitimacy of the legislative purpose is recognized. The restriction has the meaning as an institutional device to ensure the freedom and fairness of election in the sense of being involved, and in particular, it is recognized that the restriction takes place under the premise of “to affect the election.” This restriction is an inevitable measure and an inevitable regulation for securing the fairness of election. Accordingly, it cannot be said that the freedom of expression of political opinion of a candidate, the right to know the people, the right to hold public office, and the right to fundamental opinion formation in democratic politics, or it infringes on the freedom of substantial election.

In addition, the public interest, which is fair and peace in the election achieved under the provisions of this case, may be very important in a democratic state, while the restriction on fundamental rights thereby is recognized as not so much as to make it impossible for several persons to engage in such restriction, and thus, it does not infringe on the freedom of election campaign by violating the excessive prohibition principle (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2004Do4045, Nov. 25, 2004; 2004Do8716, Mar. 24, 2006; 2007Hun-Ma718, Jul. 30, 2009). The court below determined that the provision of this case does not violate the excessive prohibition principle, and determined that the act of using the Internet does not violate the excessive prohibition principle, and in order to ensure the fairness of election, which is the legislative purpose of the provisions of this case.