1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The purport of the claim and appeal is the purport of the appeal.

1. The grounds for appeal by the plaintiff citing the judgment of the court of first instance are not significantly different from the allegations in the court of first instance. However, even if examining the evidence submitted to the court of first instance in light of relevant Acts and subordinate statutes and legal principles in addition to Gap 61 through 88, the court of first instance is just in finding facts as to the invalidity of the disposition revoking the permission of this case and the illegality of the disposition rejecting the return of this case,

(1) In light of the above legal principles, it is difficult to view that the Plaintiff’s act constitutes “justifiable cause” as stipulated under Article 18(1)2 of the Livestock Excreta Act, i.e., “the Plaintiff’s act of raising livestock for not less than three years, even if considering the Plaintiff’s strong infectiousness and risk alleged by the Plaintiff, in light of the occurrence and preventive measures near the livestock shed of this case recognized by the first instance court, and the period during which the Plaintiff did not raise livestock, etc., it is difficult to deem that there is justifiable cause for the Plaintiff to not raise livestock for not less than three years. The reasons for the judgment of this court are the reasons for the judgment of the first instance except for the dismissal or addition of the judgment of the first instance as set forth in Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure

2. Parts to be removed or added;

A. The 6th instance judgment of the first instance court “Plaintiff” in the 11st instance judgment is regarded as “Defendant”.

B. On January 22, 201, 201, the first instance court held that the Plaintiff succeeded to the status of the livestock farming permit for the instant livestock shed after the first instance judgment was held 9, and thus, on January 22, 201, the said fact may be deemed as the time when the Plaintiff did not raise livestock from the instant livestock shed. However, the same applies to the fact that the Plaintiff did not raise livestock for more than three years even based on the said date, and it does not seem that there was any administrative disadvantage against the Plaintiff due to the difference in the said date.