The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

1. The summary of the grounds for appeal (unfair sentencing) of the lower court’s sentencing (an amount of KRW 3 million) is unreasonable as it is too unfasible.

2. The determination of sentencing is based on the statutory penalty, based on the discretionary determination that takes place within a reasonable and appropriate scope by taking into account the factors constituting the conditions for sentencing as prescribed in Article 51 of the Criminal Act, and there is a unique area of the first deliberation in our criminal litigation law taking the trial-oriented principle and the principle of directness.

In addition to these circumstances and the appellate court’s ex post facto and aesthetic nature, it is reasonable to respect the sentencing if there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared with the first instance court, and if the sentencing of the first instance does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, and it is desirable to refrain from rendering a sentence that does not differ from the first instance court by destroying the first instance judgment solely on the ground that the sentence of the first instance falls within the reasonable scope of discretion, even though the opinion of the appellate court is somewhat different from the opinion of the appellate court (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). The lower court sentenced the above sentence to the Defendant on the grounds of the sentencing as stated in its reasoning. In light of the fact that the Defendant violated the quarantine order for preventing the spread of viruses with very dangerous cocon with the infection, or the Defendant violated the quarantine order for the Defendant, thereby leaving the place where the Defendant was found to have violated his/her duty to be isolated during the first instance court or his/her family, and thus, did not have any other unfavorable circumstances in light of the first instance judgment.