The sentence of sentence against the defendant shall be suspended.

Punishment of the crime

From July 16, 2018, the Defendant works as the head of the B Administrative Welfare Center in the official city from July 16, 2018 and is a public official in charge of overall administration of the C area

Around February 27, 2020, the Defendant received a business report from the above E, stating the name, age, movement route, outlined domicile (G), name and occupation of the F, spouse H, I, and J around February 26, 2020, on the following: “Before February 26, 2020, the Defendant instructed the competent authorities of the administrative welfare center office located in D to report the trend of F, which was judged to have been identified as Crorona 19 viruss,” and the Defendant received the business report from the above E at around 11:40 of the same day.

On February 27, 2020, the Defendant, at the above location around 11:40 on February 27, 2020, printed two copies of the above business report to E and sent them to the H of the L pa and the team leader N, a company located in the K company, divulged the personal information of the Coinna F and contacter who came to know in the course of performing their duties.

Summary of Evidence

1. Defendant's legal statement;

1. Each police statement of E, H and N;

1. Coina virus infection-19 response guidelines (in their own use);

1. Newspaper engineers, pagebook posts, materials submitted, and cctv image closures;

1. The application of Acts and subordinate statutes to report internal investigation (LH team leader's confirmation) and investigation report (B office CCTV verification);

1. Article 71 subparagraph 5 of the Personal Information Protection Act and subparagraph 2 of Article 59 of the same Act, which provide for corresponding legal provisions concerning facts constituting an offense and select punishment;

1. Although an ordinary concurrent prosecutor indicted the instant facts charged as a single crime, the offense of violation of the Personal Information Protection Act constitutes separate crimes against each subject of information (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2016Do13263, Apr. 7, 2017), it is reasonable to deem that each of the violations of the Personal Information Protection Act against F, H, I, and J constitutes an ordinary concurrent relationship as a crime. Even if such recognition is made, it is deemed that the Defendant’s exercise of the right of defense does not interfere with the Defendant’s exercise of his/her right of defense. Accordingly, the aforementioned indictment is modified.