(a)the criteria for determining the legitimacy of the reasons for the dismissal, in the case of dismissal of a worker employed under a pilot agreement during the period of time;

(b) Whether the non-participation of the cultural education stipulated in the collective agreement constitutes justifiable grounds for disciplinary dismissal;

C. The reason for considering the legitimacy of the disciplinary action

(d) Whether it is possible to claim compensation for consolation money in addition to claiming wages from the time of reinstatement on the grounds of unfair dismissal;

A. The contract of dismissal between an employer and an employee shall be deemed to have reserved the right of dismissal for the period of time only. However, in exercising the right of dismissal reserved by the employer, the right of dismissal reserved may not be exercised only when there are objective and reasonable grounds or reasonable grounds to believe that the right of dismissal is not suitable for regular employment in light of the purpose of entering into a special agreement on the probationary relationship, unless there exist grounds for strict dismissal stipulated in the collective agreement or rules of employment, unlike the case of the conclusion of the contract in a regular manner, and even if the scope of discretion is somewhat expanded in light of the purpose of concluding the special agreement on the probationary relationship. At least, the right of dismissal reserved may be exercised only when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the worker is not suitable

B. Even if a taxi driver, who is an employee under the collective agreement, is allowed to dismiss a taxi driver, if he/she did not attend the cultural education at least twice or more, if he/she actually did not attend the cultural education, and if he/she did not make a proper attendance at the cultural education, and if the employer himself/herself did not request the attendance of the cultural education staff substantially strictly or accurately confirm and manage it by making a false list of the cultural education educators, he/she cannot be subject to disciplinary action against the employee merely because he/she did not attend the education.

C. In determining the legitimacy of a disciplinary action against workers, the determination shall be made in accordance with the facts belonging to the grounds of the disciplinary action and the legitimacy of the standards, as the strictness, limit, and specification of the grounds of the disciplinary action are required. In addition, it shall not be discussed in light of other facts than the grounds of the disciplinary action in question

D. In light of the fact that a labor contract is a bilateral contract under which an employer pays wages to a worker in return for providing labor to an employer, barring special circumstances, even if the employer unfairly dismissed the worker, the employer cannot be deemed to have suffered mental damages other than nonperformance of monetary liabilities, barring special circumstances, resulting in the obligee’s failure to pay wages and damages for delay.

Articles 27 and 27-2 of the Labor Standards Act

Plaintiff

Site Transport Corporation

1. The defendant's dismissal against the plaintiff on December 24, 1986 confirms that it is invalid.

2. From December 24, 1986 to the time when the defendant permitted the plaintiff to be reinstated to the driver who belongs to the defendant, the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the amount equivalent to 11,915 won per day.

3. The plaintiff's remaining claims are dismissed.

4. The costs of lawsuit shall be divided into five parts, four of them shall be borne by the defendant, and the remainder by the plaintiff.

5. The above paragraph 2 can be provisionally executed.

The disposition Nos. 1, 2 and the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the amount of 500,000 won and the amount of 5% per annum from December 24, 1986 to the delivery date of the copy of the complaint of this case, and 25% per annum from the next day to the full payment date.

The costs of lawsuit shall be assessed against the defendant and a provisional execution against the above money paid.

1. As to the claim for confirmation of invalidity of dismissal, we first examine.

The fact that the plaintiff joined the defendant company on September 16, 1986 and served as a taxi driver for business purpose is subject to the disposition of dismissal on December 24, 1986 is no dispute between the parties.

As to the plaintiff's assertion that the above dismissal is null and void as it was made without any justifiable reason, the defendant first agreed to issue a regular dismissal in the case where the plaintiff is judged as an eligible person by evaluating the qualification and work performance as the driver of the defendant company for a period of six months from the date of employment in the conclusion of the employment contract between the plaintiff and the plaintiff. Thus, the defendant's dismissal of the plaintiff without the pre-announcement of dismissal as provided in Article 27-2 of the Labor Standards Act is just under the above employment contract. Second, the defendant conducts self-education education once a month to the driver of the defendant company, and in light of the importance of the above education, if the driver of the defendant company did not attend two times or more in the above education, it is a ground for dismissal under the collective agreement. The plaintiff did not attend the self-education education conducted three times from September 16, 1986 to the date of dismissal as above, and the defendant's dismissal and dismissal without permission is justified.

Therefore, in full view of the first point of view, as to the first point of view, Eul evidence No. 6 (work contract) without dispute over the establishment, and the whole purport of testimony and pleading by non-party 1 and 2 of the witness, the defendant company, as to Sep. 16, 1986, employs the plaintiff as a defendant company's taxi driver on Sep. 16, 1986, the defendant company may dismiss the plaintiff at any time when the plaintiff is deemed disqualified for the type of taxi driver, and when the plaintiff is deemed qualified for the type of taxi driver, the plaintiff may dismiss the plaintiff at any time during the above period, and when the plaintiff is deemed qualified for the type of taxi driver, the defendant has agreed to employ the driver at the same time as the expiration of the time period, and the fact that the driver employed under the above time agreement has been fixed simultaneously with the expiration of the time period, unless there are special circumstances to the contrary, and there is no evidence to prove otherwise.

According to the above facts, the above employment contract between the plaintiff and the defendant is deemed to have reserved the right of dismissal against the defendant company only for the above time period. However, when the defendant exercises the right of dismissal reserved as above, it is not possible to have a strict ground for dismissal specified in the collective agreement or rules of employment, unlike the case of the conclusion of a fixed employment contract, and even if it is clear that the scope of discretion is somewhat expanded in light of the purpose of the special agreement of the above time-based contract, the above right of dismissal can not be exercised either within the full discretion of the defendant or arbitrarily, and at least when there are objective and reasonable grounds or reasonable grounds to believe that it is inappropriate for the regular employment in light of the contents and nature of the work, the reserved right of dismissal can be exercised.

Therefore, even though the defendant's failure to take the procedure of dismissal under Article 27-2 of the Labor Standards Act against the plaintiff on the ground that the plaintiff is a monthly paid worker under Article 29 of the same Act for whom six months have not passed, it cannot be a defect in the dismissal of this case, as alleged by the defendant, in determining the legitimacy of the dismissal of this case, it shall not be deemed that the defendant's separate ground for dismissal is justified. Thus, the defendant's assertion that the dismissal of this case is justifiable on the ground that the plaintiff's dismissal of this case is not necessary without considering the ground for such dismissal.

Secondly, according to the following facts: (a) No. 2 (Organization Convention) and No. 7-1 to 3 (self-education team) were recorded on the non-party 1’s testimony; (b) No. 1 to 6-1’s testimony; (c) the Plaintiff was absent from office on the non-party 1’s 7th anniversary of his non-party 1’s non-party 2’s non-party 1’s non-party 1’s non-party 2’s non-party 1’s non-party 1’s non-party 2’s non-party 3’s non-party 1’s non-party 1’s non-party 1’s non-party 2’s non-party 1’s non-party 2’s non-party 3’s non-party 1’s non-party 1’s non-party 2’s non-party 3’s non-party 1’s non-party 1’s non-party 2’s non-party 2’s non-party 2’s non-party 3’s witness.

Therefore, in this case where only three times of negligences are recognized among the reasons why the defendant had been unable to act as the reason for dismissal of the plaintiff, the defendant company did not request the plaintiff company to participate in the cultural education as seen above strictly or to accurately confirm and manage the fact of failure to act as such. In light of the fact that the defendant company did not work for the defendant company for more than three months after joining the defendant company solely on the ground of the plaintiff's negligence in the cultural education, disciplinary action against the plaintiff who was employed as a fixed driving company for more than three months after joining the defendant company was taken, which goes beyond the scope of discretion as seen earlier as to the exercise of the reserved right of dismissal, and thus, it cannot be justified in terms of social norms. Thus, the above dismissal disposition cannot be null and void.

On the other hand, the defendant alleged that the dismissal disposition against the plaintiff was justifiable in light of the above facts, in addition to the educational negligence as mentioned above, since the plaintiff exceeded five times during the defendant company's work, the dismissal disposition against the plaintiff is not justified. However, in determining the legitimacy of the disciplinary action against the worker, it is required to specify the strictness, limit, and specification of the disciplinary cause. Thus, it is not possible to consider the facts belonging to the disciplinary cause and the legitimacy of the criteria, and it is not possible to discuss the validity of the dismissal disposition in consideration of other facts than the relevant disciplinary cause. Thus, even if the above facts alleged by the defendant are true, unless it is considered as the ground for the dismissal in this case, the dismissal disposition cannot be justified. Thus, the defendant's above assertion is without merit.

2. As to the following claims for wage payment:

As seen earlier, as long as the dismissal disposition of this case is null and void, the plaintiff is a pilot of the defendant company until March 15, 1987, which was 6 months from September 16, 1986, employed for the defendant company, and until his/her reinstatement to the defendant company, and at least has the right to receive wages equivalent to the plaintiff's class at the time of the above dismissal, unless there are special circumstances, as a regular worker of the defendant company, from the next day until his/her reinstatement to the defendant company, and according to each of subparagraph 1-2 through 4 (each statement of salary) of the evidence No. 1-166 (4) of this case, each of which is without dispute over the establishment of each authenticity of this case's appeal as to the amount of wages, the plaintiff is entitled to receive wages equivalent to the plaintiff's average wage of 12,166 won per day (439,489 won + 318,474 won + 264,84 won)/84 won from the date of the dismissal. Thus, the defendant's obligation to pay the plaintiff's wages to the defendant 12.

3. Finally, we examine the claim of consolation money.

As seen earlier, the plaintiff unfairly dismissed the plaintiff to make it difficult for the plaintiff to maintain his livelihood, and the defendant suffered mental distress thereby. Thus, the defendant asserts that in order to do so, the defendant is obligated to pay 500,000 won and damages for delay to the plaintiff as consolation money to the plaintiff. However, even if the defendant unfairly dismissed the plaintiff in light of the fact that the labor contract is a bilateral contract under which the employer pays wages to the worker in return for providing labor, it can be viewed that the defendant's above wage payment obligation is merely a non-performance of the defendant's monetary liability, and it can be viewed as a non-performance of monetary liability. Unless there are special circumstances, the creditor's non-performance of monetary obligation causes damages equivalent to the amount of the claim and the damages for delay. Thus, in this case where there is no evidence to prove that the plaintiff suffered mental distress due to the above dismissal, the above dismissal disposition is invalid, and the defendant's claim for consolation money is no longer reasonable, and the above plaintiff's claim for consolation money is no longer reasonable.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is justified only within the scope of the above recognition, and the remaining claims are dismissed unfairly. It is so decided as per Disposition by applying Article 92 of the Civil Procedure Act to the burden of litigation costs, and Article 6 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings to the declaration of provisional execution.

Judges Kang Jong-soo (Presiding Judge) (Presiding Judge)