1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

1. The plaintiff's assertion

A. The instant real estate was originally owned by D, the father of the Plaintiff, and D died on May 29, 200 and became inherited by the Plaintiff.

B. However, even though the Defendant did not purchase the instant real estate from the network D, the Defendant completed the ownership transfer registration for the instant real estate based on a false guarantee under the former Act on Special Measures for the Registration of Ownership Transfer of Real Estate (Act No. 7500, hereinafter “Special Measures Act”) on December 10, 2007 (No. 40380, the receipt of No. 40380, May 15, 1994 (hereinafter “instant ownership transfer registration”). The Defendant’s registration of ownership transfer is a registration invalidation of the cause for the transfer of ownership.

2. Determination

A. Since the registration under the Act on Special Measures is presumed to be consistent with the substantive legal relationship, the parties seeking the reversal of the presumption have prepared a false letter of guarantee or confirmation under the Act on Special Measures, which forms the basis of the registration;

or forged;

The burden of proof to reverse the presumption of the registration should be proved to the extent that the registration was not duly registered due to other reasons. The presumption of the registration must be proven to the extent that the substantive entries in the guarantee certificate or written confirmation, which forms the basis of the registration, are not true. Unless there is such proof, the presumption of the registration is not reversed, and the fact that the guarantor prepared and issued a certificate of guarantee to guarantee the alteration of rights claimed by the registered titleholder without knowing the alteration of rights, does not reverse the presumption of the registration.

(See Supreme Court Decision 2005Da2189 delivered on April 29, 2005). B.

The following circumstances, i.e., Gap evidence Nos. 1, 2, Eul evidence Nos. 1, 2, and 1 and 2, and each fact-finding with respect to the common market of this court, which are acknowledged by adding the whole purport of the pleadings to the whole purport of the arguments: