1. Revocation of the first instance judgment.

2. On October 1, 2013, regarding the real estate stated in the separate sheet between the Defendants and D.

1. The reasoning for this part of the judgment of the court of first instance is as stated in Paragraph (1) of the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for the dismissal of part of the judgment of the court of first instance as follows. Thus, this part is cited by the main sentence of Article 420

The second-class 15 to 3-class 4 of the first-class judgment are as follows.

“2) D) The buyer received KRW 10 million on September 30, 2013, KRW 200 million on September 30, 2013, KRW 300 million on October 21, 2013, and KRW 71,552,436 on October 31, 2013, respectively.

The third-party 14 through 17 of the judgment of the court of first instance are as follows. D notified D to pay KRW 701,407,430 of the capital gains tax of this case by March 31, 2014, although D did not pay the same.

In a separate lawsuit filed by the Plaintiff against Defendant A (Seoul Southern District Court 2015Gahap109530, hereinafter “ separate lawsuit”) on June 10, 2016, the act of paying KRW 464,00,000 as of October 31, 2013 and KRW 130,000,000 as of November 14, 2013 has been revoked, and the Defendant A paid to the Plaintiff 594,00,000 and 5% interest per annum as of November 14, 2013 has become final and conclusive from the day following the date this judgment became final and conclusive to the day of full payment, and the said judgment became final and conclusive around that time, the capital gains tax of this case was paid in the amount of KRW 594,24,100,000 as of July 8, 2016, the capital gains tax of this case was paid in the amount of KRW 30,000,00.

A person shall be appointed.

2. The parties' assertion

A. D, in excess of the Plaintiff’s assertion, donated the instant forest land to the Defendants, thereby undermining the financial standing of the Defendants. The Defendants were well aware of these circumstances as D’s wife or child. Therefore, the gift of the instant forest land ought to be revoked as a fraudulent act.

B. At the time of donation of forest land of this case by the Defendants, D did not have a debt in excess, and even after the above donation, D had a financial capability to pay the transfer income tax of this case.