The appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. At least two co-offenders who are jointly engaged in a crime do not require any legal penalty, but only if two or more persons conspired to commit a crime and thereby intend to realize the crime, and there was no process of the whole conspiracy;

Even if there are two or more persons, there is a public contestal relationship if the combination of doctors is made in order or impliedly.

In addition, even if a person is not directly involved in the act of execution, even if he/she is not directly involved in the act of execution, he/she is subject to criminal liability as a joint principal offender, and such conspiracy may be recognized in accordance with the circumstantial facts and empirical rules, even if there is no direct evidence (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2010Do4606, Jun. 28, 2012; 2012Do10629, Jan. 24, 2013).

In light of the specific circumstances, such as the content and nature of the administrative affairs dealt with, it is not necessary to establish a trust relationship with the principal by failing to perform any act that is expected to be naturally expected under the provisions of statutes, the terms of the contract, or the good faith principle, or performing any act that is expected not to be naturally performed (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 9Do4923, Mar. 14, 2000). The criminal intent of breach of trust is sufficient to recognize that an act of breach of trust causes or is likely to cause property damage to the principal as a result of the act of breach of trust, and it is not necessary to have the intention to cause property damage to the principal or obtain property profit to the principal or to enable a third party to obtain property profit to the principal (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 9Do2781, May 26, 200). Such recognition is insufficient recognition, and where the defendant denies the criminal intent of breach of trust, as in the case of this case.