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1. The part concerning the conjunctive claim of the first instance judgment against the Plaintiff, which constitutes the following payment order.
Reasons
1. The reasoning of this court concerning this part of the facts admitted is that the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance is the same as that of the judgment of the court of first instance.
2. The main point of the Plaintiff’s assertion is that the sales contract on December 3, 2010 was amended on March 2, 2010. On December 3, 2010, the sales contract was rescinded by having the Plaintiff express his/her intent of rescission upon the Defendant’s request for the preparation of the multilateral contract, and having the Defendant impliedly accepted it. Even if not, the contract was rescinded due to the Defendant’s cause, the Defendant is obligated to return the down payment amount of KRW 20 million and the intermediate payment of KRW 35 million already received.
Preliminaryly, the Defendant had the obligation to return at least KRW 30 million out of the down payment amount already paid to C as the contract amount was rescinded on March 2, 2010 on the grounds that the part concerning the payment of KRW 200 million was not resolved in lieu of the payment of KRW 400 million, which was to be borne by C among KRW 400 million of the purchase price, and the Defendant had the obligation to return at least KRW 30 million of the down payment already paid to C. On December 3, 2010, the sales contract was rescinded due to the Defendant’s failure to resolve the issue of easements established on the instant real estate, and thus, the Defendant is obligated to return KRW 15 million received as the down payment of the sales contract on December 3, 2010.
3. Determination
A. Before determining the primary claim, the sales contract on December 3, 2010 is deemed to have been amended on March 2, 2010.
In addition to the purport of the entire pleadings, the following circumstances, namely, the Defendant sent to the Plaintiff a mail that the contract was rescinded on March 2, 2010 on the grounds that the intermediate payment was not paid, and thereafter, the Defendant newly concluded a sales contract on December 3, 2010.