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The appeal is dismissed.
Reasons
The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed).
Article 11(1) of the Control of Firearms, Swords, Explosives, etc. Act provides that "any other things that seem to be similar to that of a gun, which meet the requirements prescribed by Presidential Decree, shall be construed as "a captive gun" and prohibits the manufacture, sale and possession thereof
Here, “a gun that seems to be similar to a gun” includes cases where the shape of a gun is similar to that of a gun and cases where it is deemed similar to that of a gun because its function is similar to that of a gun.
(See Supreme Court Decision 2010Do11030 Decided January 27, 201). Accordingly, Article 13 and [Attachment Table 5-2] subparag. 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the Control of Firearms, Swords, Explosives, etc. Act provide that “those made of materials other than metal or metal, which are highly likely to be misused for crimes because of their shape similar to that of a gun,” and “[Attachment Table 5-2] subparag. 2 of the same Table provides that “those made of materials other than metal or metal, which fall under any of the following subparagraphs and are likely to cause harm to human life and body,” and “[Attachment Table 5-2] subparag. 2 of the same Article provides that “any those made of materials other than metal or metal, and which are likely to cause harm to human life and body,”
For the reasons indicated in its holding, the lower court determined that the status of an unprefabricatedd part does not constitute a maternity gun, and that the above provision prohibiting possession of a maternity gun does not violate the principle of clarity or the principle of excessive prohibition under the principle of no punishment without the law, and rejected the allegation in the grounds for appeal, such as misconception of facts by the defendant, violation of the Constitution, etc.
The judgment below
Examining the reasoning in light of the aforementioned statutes, legal principles, and evidence duly admitted, the lower court erred in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the maternity firearms, etc. prescribed by the Control of Firearms, Swords, Explosives, etc. Act, or by misapprehending the principle of no punishment without