beta
Text
1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.
2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
Reasons
1. On October 25, 2013, based on the executory exemplification of the No. 157 of the No. 157 (hereinafter “instant notarial deed”), the Defendant seized corporeal movables against Nonparty B, on October 25, 2013, on the basis of the fact that the Defendant attached corporeal movables to the movables listed in the separate sheet No. 102 Dong-gu Seoul building C on October 1013 (hereinafter “instant corporeal movables”). There is no dispute between the parties.
2. On December 22, 2012, the Plaintiff lent KRW 400,00,00 to B, and on April 30, 2013, the Plaintiff prepared a notarial deed stating that the said corporeal movables, including the instant corporeal movables, shall be transferred by means of possession and alteration, and the Plaintiff acquired the ownership of the instant corporeal movables, and accordingly, the Plaintiff asserts that compulsory execution based on the notarial deed, premised on the ownership of B, should be denied.
Where the plaintiff asserts that he/she is the owner of the object of compulsory execution and files a lawsuit of demurrer with a third party, the plaintiff shall bear the burden of proving that he/she is his/her
However, according to the evidence No. 1, although the plaintiff and B prepared a notarial deed for a loan for consumption of money for security with the same content as the plaintiff's assertion, it is recognized that the notarial deed was prepared between the plaintiff and B, the following circumstances acknowledged by comprehensively considering the overall purport of the statements and arguments No. 2, No. 4-1 and No. 4-2, namely, the plaintiff and B as a relative by marriage, borrowing money from a relative relationship and preparing a notarial deed in the course of compulsory execution, it seems to be an exceptional situation. D's spouse applied for a preferential purchase as a spouse in the course of compulsory execution, and the moving-in report was made by B to live together with the plaintiff's legal representative and his father's domicile on December 20, 2012. In light of the above, each of the statements No. 1 through 5 alone is insufficient to recognize that the corporeal movables of this case as the plaintiff's ownership
3. Conclusion Then, this case.