The prosecutor's appeal is dismissed.

An applicant for compensation shall be dismissed.

1. The decision of the court below on the summary of the grounds for appeal (the imprisonment with prison labor for six months, the suspension of execution for two years, and the community service order for 120 hours);

2. In a case where there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the first instance court, and where the sentencing of the first instance does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect such a case (see Supreme Court Decision 2015Do3260, Jul. 23, 2015). Based on the foregoing legal doctrine, the lower court, based on the foregoing, determined the sentence by taking into account the various circumstances as indicated in its reasoning.

In addition to the circumstances indicated by the lower court, no new circumstance exists to change the sentence of the lower court in the trial, and even considering all the sentencing factors indicated in the argument of the instant case, such as the Defendant’s age, sexual conduct, environment, motive and means of the crime, and circumstances after the crime, the lower court’s sentencing was too unfeasible and so it exceeded the reasonable scope of discretion.

It does not appear.

Therefore, prosecutor's assertion is without merit.

3. In conclusion, the prosecutor’s appeal is dismissed in accordance with Article 364(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act on the grounds that the prosecutor’s appeal is without merit, and the application for compensation by the applicant for compensation is dismissed in accordance with Article 25(3)3 and Article 32(1)3 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings, since the scope of the liability for compensation is not clear, and thus, the application for compensation by the applicant for compensation is dismissed in accordance with Article 25(3)3 and Article 32(1)3 of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings (Provided, That “before March 23, 2016” of the 18th page of the lower judgment is obvious that it is a clerical error of “within February 6, 201