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1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.
2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.
Reasons
1. On June 21, 201, at the time when the Plaintiff entered into a contract with D and life insurance agency contract with D on June 21, 2011, the Defendant jointly and severally guaranteed the obligation to recover fees and compensate for damages for the Plaintiff, and the Defendant, a joint and several surety, jointly and severally, is jointly and severally liable with D to refund advance payment fees of KRW 90,656,918 to the Plaintiff.
According to the result of the written request for appraisal of appraiser E by this court, it is recognized that the signature of the defendant's name stated in the written confirmation of June 21, 201, which promised the defendant's joint and several liability obligation is inconsistent with the penology of the defendant, and according to the evidence No. 1, since the seal affixed to the above written confirmation is the name of the representative of the corporation D without stating the name of the representative, the above written confirmation promising the defendant's joint and several liability obligation cannot be recognized as it is not recognized as having been signed and sealed by the defendant, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge
(A) Although the Plaintiff did not prepare the above confirmation document, the Plaintiff asserted that it was a joint and several surety when concluding an insurance contract with another insurance company, and thus ratified the joint and several surety contract, it is difficult to deem that the Plaintiff ratified the joint and several surety contract solely on the ground that the Plaintiff asserts. The primary ground for
2. The plaintiff asserts that, in the preliminary claim, the defendant, as the plaintiff leased his name to the actual representative of D Co., Ltd., the defendant bears the joint and several liability as the name truster under Article 24 of the Commercial Act.
Although there is no dispute between the parties that the defendant was registered as an internal director on the registry because he was not the actual representative of D, the defendant had the defendant used his name as an internal director on the registry.
The scope of permission for use is the status of internal director of corporation D.