Of the part against the Defendant of the lower judgment, the part of the claim for restitution of overdue rent and unjust enrichment equivalent to the rent shall be reversed.

The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed).

1. As to the ground of appeal No. 1, the lower court determined that the Defendant is liable to pay to the Plaintiff unjust enrichment equivalent to the rent calculated at the rate of KRW 1.40,00 per month from April 10 to December 29, 2015, on the grounds that the Defendant, from the termination of the instant lease agreement to the completion date of delivery of the instant real estate, obtained profits from the possession and use of the instant real estate, and thereby, incurred damages equivalent to the amount of such profits from use by the lessor, thereby causing losses to the Plaintiff.

(2) However, it is difficult to accept the above determination by the lower court.

Benefits in return of unjust enrichment on the ground of the benefit without legal grounds mean the actual benefit.

Therefore, in a case where a lessee continued possession of the leased building after the lease agreement was terminated, but no substantial profit was gained due to the lessee’s failure to use the leased building or make profit according to the original purpose of the lease agreement, even if the damage was incurred to the lessor, the lessee’s return of

This is the same even if the lessee was unable to use the leased building due to the lessee’s circumstances or the lessee was not removed from his/her facility.

(See Supreme Court Decision 2003Da60488 Decided January 29, 2004). According to the reasoning of the lower judgment and the record, although the instant lease agreement was terminated by the Plaintiff’s declaration of termination on the grounds of delinquency in rent at least two occasions on April 9, 2015, the Plaintiff failed to refund the lease deposit, and the purpose of the instant real estate is a factory, and the Defendant asserted that it was a director by newly concluding a lease agreement on another factory during the first instance trial.