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(영문) 울산지방법원 2019.12.19 2019나10002
건물명도(인도)
Text

1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Purport of claim and appeal

The first instance court.

Reasons

1. The reasoning of the court’s explanation of this case is as stated in the reasoning of the judgment of the first instance, except where the plaintiff added or added the judgment as set forth in paragraph (2) below, and thus, it is acceptable in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. The addition;

A. 1) Determination as to a request for extradition based on possessory right has been made to the Plaintiff as the trustor and the de facto owner. Around January 2008, the Defendant occupied the instant building without permission and lost the Plaintiff’s possession. Therefore, the Defendant asserts that the possessor is obliged to deliver the instant building to the Plaintiff who is the possessor of the right to claim for recovery of possession. Therefore, the possession refers to an objective relationship, which appears to belong to a person’s factual control under social norms, and in order to have de facto control, it does not necessarily mean a physical and real control, but should be determined in conformity with social norms by taking into account the time and spatial relationship with the goods, the relationship between the goods and the owner, and the possibility of excluding others’ control. In a lawsuit for recovery of possession, it is necessary to examine only whether the Defendant occupied the building at the time of his/her allegation that he/she was deprived of possession.

(See Supreme Court Decision 95Da8713 delivered on August 23, 1996). In light of the above legal principles, the Plaintiff asserted that the Plaintiff could exercise influence over the instant building as the truster and the de facto owner of the instant building without having directly occupied the instant building in the process of acquiring the ownership of the instant building and trust it to C. Thus, the evidence submitted by the Plaintiff alone is insufficient to acknowledge that the Plaintiff occupied the instant building on or around January 2008.

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