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(영문) 수원지방법원 2015.11.20 2015구단32357
영업정지처분취소
Text

1. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Reasons

1. Details of the disposition;

A. On January 22, 2015, the Plaintiff, along with her husband B, operated a general restaurant with the trade name “D” from the Masan-si, Masan-si C and the 1st century. On January 22, 2015, the Plaintiff sold the 2-child disease to two juveniles, thereby providing juvenile alcoholic beverages.

B. Accordingly, on March 11, 2015, the Defendant rendered a disposition of business suspension for two months pursuant to Article 75 of the Food Sanitation Act and Article 89 of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act (hereinafter “instant disposition”).

C. The Plaintiff appealed and filed an administrative appeal, but was dismissed on June 17, 2015.

[Ground of recognition] Evidence No. 1, No. 3, and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the disposition is lawful;

A. The Plaintiff’s husband’s assertion thorough examination of his identification card against ordinary juveniles, but on the same day, he did not conduct an examination of his identification card on the ground of the above juveniles, and he could not verify his identification card against the juveniles on the wind that he was immediately going from the entrance of the first floor to the second floor. The above juveniles were in cremation, and they appear to have been adults. Considering the fact that the Plaintiff’s husband caused damage to the Plaintiff’s family’s livelihood, such as the Plaintiff’s occurrence and threat of the Plaintiff’s family’s livelihood by the instant disposition, the instant disposition should be revoked as an illegal disposition that deviates from and abused discretionary power.

(b) as shown in the attached Form of the relevant statutes;

C. The following circumstances are acknowledged based on each of the statements and arguments stated in Eul evidence Nos. 5, 6, 7, and 8 and the purport of the whole pleadings. In other words, the juveniles who entered D at the time were only born in November 98 and November 97, and there was an objective situation that the above juveniles could be perceived as adults on the sole basis of the Plaintiff’s assertion.

It cannot be deemed that there was any circumstance in which the identification card was not verifiable.

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