The judgment below

Of them, the part against Defendant C shall be reversed.

Defendant

C A person shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than six months.

Defendant

A.

1. The summary of the grounds for appeal is too unreasonable that each sentence (one and half years of imprisonment with prison labor for the defendants A, ten months of imprisonment with prison labor for the defendants C, and six months of short term) declared by the court below to the defendants.

2. The Korean Criminal Procedure Act, which takes the trial-oriented principle and direct principle as to the grounds for appeal by Defendant A, has the unique area of the first instance judgment, and where there is no change in the conditions of sentencing compared to the first instance judgment, and the first instance sentencing does not deviate from the reasonable scope of discretion, it is reasonable to respect it even the appellate court.

(See Supreme Court en banc Decision 2015Do3260 Decided July 23, 2015). Defendant recognized and reflected the instant crime.

In the court below, the defendant agreed with four victims, and further agreed with two victims.

However, even though the defendant was sentenced to transfer of juvenile protection cases or criminal punishment several times due to special larceny and fraud, he/she again committed the crime of this case during the suspension of execution and probation period.

In addition, considering the following circumstances, comprehensively taking into account the Defendant’s character and behavior, environment, motive, means and consequence of the commission of the crime, and the circumstances after the commission of the crime, the lower court’s sentence cannot be deemed unfair because it goes beyond the reasonable scope of discretion and goes beyond the reasonable scope of discretion.

Therefore, the defendant's appeal is without merit, and it is dismissed in accordance with Article 364 (4) of the Criminal Procedure Act. It is so decided as per Disposition.

3. On April 5, 2001, the Defendant was born on April 5, 2001, and was sentenced to an irregular term of punishment by falling under “juvenile” under Article 2 of the Juvenile Act at the time of the pronouncement of the lower judgment. However, it is apparent that the Defendant was no longer a juvenile under the age of 19, and therefore, the Defendant was sentenced to an irregular term of punishment as above.