1. The Intervenor’s appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal are borne by the Intervenor joining the Defendant.

purport.

1. The reasoning of the judgment of the court on this part is as stated in Paragraph (1) of the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance. Thus, this part is cited in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main text of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. Whether the decision on the retrial of this case is lawful

A. The gist of the Plaintiff’s assertion 1) The Intervenor’s auditor G directly attended and stated at the Intervenor’s Personnel Committee on July 20, 2017, which is closely related with the Plaintiff’s primary disciplinary grounds, and the Plaintiff’s director J who inflicted an injury on the Plaintiff in relation to the Plaintiff’s appeal that the Intervenor’s director J participated in the deliberation and resolution of the said Personnel Committee was involved by interested parties in the deliberation of the disciplinary case, and the Intervenor’s personnel regulations (hereinafter “instant personnel regulations”).

) In addition, Article 51 was violated. The Intervenor did not notify the Plaintiff of the attendance at the board of directors seven days prior to the date on which the board of directors was held. Accordingly, the instant dismissal was procedurally unlawful. (ii) At the time of G and the Intervenor, the chief director I (the Intervenor was the chief director of the Intervenor before M was appointed as the president of the Intervenor on February 19, 2016) at the time of the Intervenor and G contain the content that the letter of mutual performance, prepared on August 25, 2015, guarantees the Plaintiff’s status as the Plaintiff, which constitutes a contract for a third party (Plaintiff) under the Civil Act.

The dismissal of this case does not take effect against the contents of the above mutual performance certificate.

3 G sexual harassment was committed while conducting regular and occasional audits.

Therefore, it is not true that the Plaintiff planned and fabricated sexual harassment in order to attract G, but the primary grounds for the dismissal of the instant case are not recognized.

In addition, the Plaintiff’s visiting a labor company’s office to receive legal consultation on disciplinary dismissal on July 10, 2017 constitutes the Plaintiff’s exercise of the Plaintiff’s right of defense, and thus, cannot be deemed as grounds for disciplinary action.

(b) relevant regulations, etc.