1. On March 22, 2016, the Defendant’s disposition to pay disability benefits to the Plaintiff is revoked.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be.

1. Details of the disposition;

A. From June 13, 1967, to June 25, 1972, the Plaintiff served as coal parts in the Mining Center B.

B. On June 4, 2015, the Plaintiff was diagnosed by the Yangchine Ethal Ethal Ethal Ethal Ethal Ethal Estal Estal Estal Estal Estal Estal Estal Estal Estal Estal Estal Estal Estal Estal Estal Estal E

C. On March 22, 2016, the Defendant rendered a disposition of disability benefit site pay (hereinafter “instant disposition”) on the ground that “the Plaintiff was diagnosed of the hearing impairment by both sides of the D Hospital on December 4, 1999, and registered the class 6 of the hearing disability under the Act on Welfare of Persons with Disabilities.” The Plaintiff’s claim for disability benefit was completed three years after the date of leaving the noise workplace and the date of diagnosis by the Noise Agency (hereinafter “instant disposition”).

The Plaintiff was dissatisfied with the instant disposition and dismissed, but again filed a request for reexamination with the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Reexamination Committee, but it was dismissed on the ground that “the Plaintiff’s right to claim disability benefits has expired, and it is difficult to recognize a causal relationship between the upper branch and the business thereof.”

[Reasons for Recognition] Unsatisfy, Gap evidence Nos. 1, 2, 3 (including virtual numbers), Eul evidence Nos. 1, 2, 5, and 11, and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Determination on the legitimacy of the disposition

A. The Plaintiff’s assertion 1) was exposed to severe noise while working as an bomb for about six years. Accordingly, the occurrence of the instant injury or the existing disease was aggravated to a natural progress speed. As such, a proximate causal relation between the Plaintiff and the instant injury and the instant injury and disease is acknowledged. 2) Since disability diagnosis for the registration of disabled persons under the Act on Welfare of Persons with Disabilities and Cheong-power diagnosis for the claim for disability benefits under the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act differ in their criteria, even if the Plaintiff completed the registration of disabled persons under the Act on Welfare of Persons with Disabilities, it cannot be said that the extinctive prescription has run from